Federal Expansion and the Decay of State
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Diego A. Zambrano†
At the turn of the twenty-first century, the country entered its third era of judicial federalism. That era is defined by federal judicial expansion into areas of statecourt power and federal monopolization of large and complex litigation. These
changes, in turn, have coincided with the decay of state courts. Whether measured
by funding, delays, or docket loads, state courts—the true workhorses of the American legal system—have declined relative to federal courts. Indeed, over the last decade, state chief justices have complained that state courts are “financially bankrupt,”
“at ‘the tipping point of dysfunction,’” and “on the edge of an abyss.” This state-court
decay could not come at a worse time—due to federal efforts to circumscribe access
to court, there have been growing calls for a turn to state courts. But that turn cannot
work without vibrant and well-funded state judiciaries. Thus, federal expansion
and state-court decay represent the most fundamental developments in judicial
federalism.
This Article explores the rise of federal courts and apparent fall of state courts
and analyzes the relationship between these two developments. At its core, the Article
makes the original claim that federal expansion may be contributing to the decay of
state courts and has reinforced a plaintiff-defendant divergence between the two systems. In laying the groundwork for that argument, the Article offers three contributions. First, it provides the first historical periodization of judicial federalism, oriented around three broad eras with distinctive philosophies toward the federal-state
allocation of cases. The Article presents significant evidence that in the 1980s and
1990s the country entered a new era of judicial federalism when, for the first time in
the nation’s history, the federal government began to aggressively appropriate statecourt litigation. Second, the bulk of the Article draws on a wealth of political economy literature and empirical data to step back and evaluate the potentially positive
and negative effects of federal-court expansion. The third era has allowed institutional litigants to opt out of state courts, leading to negative distributional consequences for small-stakes litigants. For example, when federal courts siphon large
litigants from state court, state legislatures lose existing political pressure to fund
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those courts, potentially leading to deteriorating judiciaries that ultimately affect
family courts, employees, and consumers. This state-to-federal emigration of institutional litigants may also explain one of the most puzzling recent developments in
civil procedure: while federal courts have embraced prodefendant procedural rules
in the class action, personal jurisdiction, and pleading contexts, state courts remain
relatively proplaintiff, leading to a clear divergence between the two systems and a
host of normative concerns. Finally, after laying out these consequences, the Article
briefly sketches a few potential remedies to improve state courts, including federal
funding for state judiciaries and a push for more state complex litigation courts.
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INTRODUCTION
Judicial federalism is the set of doctrines and norms that govern the relationship between state and federal courts.1 That relationship, in turn, is at the center of the American legal system. It
determines litigants’ access to federal court, the vertical distribution of judicial power, the coherence of federal and state substantive law, and the shape of procedural law.2 Most importantly, judicial federalism regulates which judiciary, state or federal, has
the power “to settle policy questions which affect the lives, liberty,
or purses of men, corporations, and governments.”3
Judicial power is not evenly distributed between the state
and federal systems. Federal courts host less than three hundred
thousand civil cases a year while state courts bear the brunt of
nearly seventeen million civil cases.4 Despite this state predominance over docket loads, state courts are mired in relative decay.
While federal courts are well funded, politically independent, and
host the largest claims,5 state judicial systems have “struggled
with layoffs, hiring freezes and cutbacks in services.” 6 Indeed,
some courts have become “financially bankrupt”7 and others have
faced “unprecedented budget crises.” 8 Moreover, while federal
courts have embraced prodefendant procedural rules in the class
action, arbitration, and pleading contexts—circumscribing access

1
See Louise Weinberg, The New Judicial Federalism, 29 Stan L Rev 1191, 1196–97
(1977). See also generally Michael E. Solimine and James L. Walker, Respecting State
Courts: The Inevitability of Judicial Federalism (Praeger 1999).
2
See generally James E. Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and
the Constitutionality of Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation, 101 Nw U L Rev 191 (2007);
Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 124 Harv L Rev
869 (2011).
3
William M. Wiecek, The Reconstruction of Federal Judicial Power, 1863–1875, 13
Am J Legal Hist 333, 333 (1969).
4
Paula Hannaford-Agor, Scott Graves, and Shelley Spacek Miller, The Landscape
of Civil Litigation in State Courts *6 n 36 (National Center for State Courts, Civil Justice
Initiative, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/H4G4-LBPS (NCSC Report).
5
See Part I.C.
6
Don J. Debenedictis, Struggling toward Recovery: Courts Hope That BeltTightening Lessons from the Recession Will Help Them Make It through the ‘90s, 80 ABA
J 50, 50 (1994).
7
Id at 51.
8
Lisa Lambert, U.S. States Moved beyond Budget Crises in 2012—Census (Reuters,
Apr 11, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/VW48-3ESR. For more on the current situation,
see Editorial, State Courts at the Tipping Point (NY Times, Nov 24, 2009), archived at
http://perma.cc/7WZ7-DS4G; Geoffrey McGovern and Michael D. Greenberg, Who Pays for
Justice? Perspectives on State Court System Financing and Governance *1 (RAND Corporation, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/ENH8-T6LE.
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to court in the process—state courts have remained relatively proplaintiff and have ensured broader access to court.9 This growing
divergence between the two systems raises problematic questions
about judicial federalism.
This Article explores the rise of federal courts and apparent
fall of state courts and analyzes the relationship between these
two developments. At its core, the Article makes the original
claim that federal expansion may be contributing to the decay of
state courts and has reinforced a plaintiff-defendant divergence
between the two systems. Although scholars have addressed judicial federalism from many angles, they have largely overlooked
the emergence of a new era of federal expansion, its procedural
underpinnings, and its relationship to broader trends in statecourt funding.10 Indeed, scholars have offered a litany of factors
attempting to explain state-court “inferiority,” from judicial elections to the demise of legendary common-law judges.11 These factors are part of a broad mix of causes for relative state-court decay, including balanced-budget requirements, structural federal
advantages in a globalized economy, and generalized austerity at
9
See Diego A. Zambrano, The States’ Interest in Federal Procedure, 70 Stan L Rev
1805, 1879 (2018) (“While the federal judiciary continues to close its doors, the states have
refused to mimic this retrenchment.”).
10 The most closely related recent work comes from Professors Samuel Issacharoff
and Catherine M. Sharkey, who began to map out federalization of state litigation over a
decade ago. See generally Samuel Issacharoff and Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L Rev 1353 (2006). A related literature in the late 1980s and early
1990s also focused on federalization and the values of judicial federalism. See, for example,
Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform 169–317 (Harvard 1985);
Laurence H. Tribe, The Relationship between the Federal and State Courts, in Cynthia
Harrison and Russell R. Wheeler, eds, The Federal Appellate Judiciary in the 21st Century
107, 115–16 (Federal Judicial Center, 1989), archived at http://perma.cc/N4SM-PFTW.
See also generally Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business between the State and Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and “The Martian Chronicles”,
78 Va L Rev 1769 (1992); Erwin Chemerinsky and Larry Kramer, Defining the Role of the
Federal Courts, 1990 BYU L Rev 67; Daniel J. Meador, Transformation of the American
Judiciary, 46 Ala L Rev 763 (1995). Further afield, an unrelated strain of scholarship
addresses the importance of state constitutional rights. See, for example, Shirley
S. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions: The Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 Tex L Rev 1141, 1144–55 (1985) (describing three eras of state
constitutional criminal law). Most of this literature has ignored federalization’s effect on
state courts.
11 See, for example, Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 Harv L Rev 1105, 1121–
29 (1977) (arguing that federal courts are superior to state courts due to a variety of institutional features, including presidential appointment of federal judges); John C.P.
Goldberg, Benjamin Cardozo and the Death of the Common Law, 34 Touro L Rev 147,
147, 154 (2018) (claiming that “there is no member of a state judiciary who rivals
[Justice Benjamin] Cardozo in stature,” and that “judges today have little feel” for the
common law).
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the state level. This Article does not set forth a strong or exclusive
causal argument but seeks only to identify a disregarded contributing factor: federalization of state claims in the past forty years
seems to be an important driver in the relative decline of state
courts’ budgets, stature, and role as common-law innovators.
In order to lay the groundwork for my claims, I begin by
briefly categorizing the history of judicial federalism. That inquiry requires a historical periodization that can identify the
evolving relationship between state and federal courts and shed
light on what, if anything, is truly new about the past few decades. The aim here is not to build a new legal history framework
but instead to show that developments since 1980 represent a
break from earlier eras. My focus is specifically on the doctrine
that determines the allocation of cases: subject matter jurisdiction. In order to organize its ups and downs over the centuries, I
propose three eras with distinctive philosophies toward the allocation of cases between the two judicial systems.
The first era began in 1789 when the Framers created a partially integrated federal-state judicial system through a web of
overlapping jurisdiction, substantive laws, and a unified constitutional ethos.12 The defining feature of that First Era of Partial
Integration, for our purposes, is that under Article III and the Judiciary Act of 1789, state judiciaries were the primary trial courts
for federal claims because federal courts did not have plenary federal question jurisdiction.13
By contrast, the Second Era of Dual Judicial Sovereignty began tentatively with the Jurisdiction and Removal Act of 1875—
which granted federal courts the power to hear all federal statutory claims. 14 By then, the antebellum idea of limited federal
courts had run its course, opening the way for federal control over
federal law cases. But as federal judicial power grew in the early
1900s, something interesting then happened: progressives
launched an all-out attack against diversity jurisdiction. Justice
Louis Brandeis, Justice Felix Frankfurter, and even Judge Henry
Friendly, later known as a conservative jurist, produced
magisterial work taking diversity to task as a tool for corporate
12 See Max Farrand, ed, 1 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 124–25 (Yale
1911); Judiciary Act of 1789, ch 20, §§ 9–12, 1 Stat 73, 76–80. See also Charles Warren,
New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 Harv L Rev 49, 65–66
(1923); Henry M. Hart Jr, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv L Rev 1362, 1401–02 (1953).
13 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch 20, §§ 9–12, 1 Stat 73, 76–80.
14 See Part I.B.
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defendants to escape state courts.15 Drawing on these critiques,
the American Law Institute (ALI) proposed in 1969 a clean division of judicial labor under a principle I call “Dual Judicial Sovereignty,” the idea that federal claims should be heard exclusively
in federal court and state claims in state court. The ALI’s plan
provoked a decade-long legislative and judicial movement to create abstention doctrines, 16 shift federal claims to federal court,
and abolish diversity jurisdiction17—a move supported by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP) and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and
adopted by the House of Representatives in 1978.18 Despite Senator Ted Kennedy’s support,19 the ALI’s groundbreaking proposal
failed in the Senate.
The Article then argues that in the 1980s and 1990s, the federal government launched a third era of judicial federalism in
which, for the first time in the nation’s history, the government
became committed to the expansion of both diversity and federal
question jurisdiction.20 Provoked partly by a Reagan-era backlash
against “out-of-control”21 state courts, starting in 1980, Congress
initiated a series of changes I call “federal expansion” that (1) aggressively federalized areas previously governed by state law, including state class action claims; (2) promoted the concentration
of monetarily significant claims in federal court; and (3) unintentionally contributed to the decay of state courts. As a result of the
third era’s wide-ranging reforms, more than 50 percent of federal

15 See Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 Harv L Rev
483, 498 (1928); Felix Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power between United States
and State Courts, 13 Cornell L Q 499, 523 (1928); Erie Railroad Co v Tompkins, 304 US
64, 78–80 (1938) (Brandeis).
16 See, for example, Colorado River Water Conservation District v United States, 424
US 800, 817 (1976); Younger v Harris, 401 US 37, 43–44 (1971); Huffman v Pursue, Ltd,
420 US 592, 603–05 (1975).
17 See American Law Institute, Study of the Division of Jurisdiction between State
and Federal Courts 3–4 (1969) (ALI Study); notes 120–29.
18 See note 123.
19 See note 124 and accompanying text.
20 See Part I.C.
21 Willy E. Rice, Allegedly Biased, Intimidating, and Incompetent State Court Judges
and the Questionable Removal of State Law Class Actions to Purportedly Impartial and
Competent Federal Courts—A Historical Perspective and an Empirical Analysis of Class
Action Disposition in Federal and State Courts, 1925–2011, 3 Wm & Mary Bus L Rev 419,
425 (2012).

2019]

Federal Expansion

2107

class action claims in some contexts assert state-law claims;22 federal jurisdiction is routinely manufactured in what are essentially state law cases; and corporate litigants routinely find a jurisdictional hook to enter federal court.23 Accordingly, the median
damages award in federal cases has gone from $8,000 in 1980 to
$60,000 in 2015; the mean from $544,000 to $1.4 million.24 Unlike
these massive claims that now dominate federal dockets, 75 percent of state-court cases involve damages awards of less than
$5,000.25 Moreover, I present evidence that suggests state-court
budgets have been growing at a much smaller pace since 1982
relative to federal-court budgets.26 In short, federal courts control
the largest cases and have increasingly consumed state-court
dockets.
After laying out these three eras of judicial federalism, the
heart of the Article draws on a wealth of political economy literature to evaluate the effects that federal expansion can have on
state courts.27 To be sure, federalization has the potential to bring
a wealth of benefits, as it allows federal courts to manage cases
with national repercussions, police negative externalities stemming from state law, and bring uniformity to federal law. Moreover, I argue that federal expansion can lead to federal-state competition for cases—spurring state governments to streamline
their court systems.28
Despite these benefits, the Article argues that an expanding
federal judiciary may actually contribute to the decay of state
courts.29 This novel claim runs counter to scholarship in the area
which has failed to identify this connection and has instead worried that federalization may overburden and weaken federal—not

22 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Arbitration Study: Report to Congress,
Pursuant to Dodd-Frank Wall Street and Consumer Protection Act § 1028(a) § 6, *20–21
(Mar 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/GRD2-4PRG.
23 See Thomas E. Willging and Shannon R. Wheatman, An Empirical Examination
of Attorneys’ Choice of Forum in Class Action Litigation *8 (Federal Judicial Center, 2005),
archived at http://perma.cc/JPR8-4TM4 (noting that defense-side attorneys in removed
cases tended to report an expectation that federal courts would rule favorably toward them
on pretrial matters).
24 See Part I.C.3.
25 See note 251 and accompanying text.
26 See Part I.C.4.
27 See Parts II–III.
28 See Part III.B. See also Zambrano, 70 Stan L Rev at 1845–46 (cited in note 9).
29 See Part II.
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state—courts and could even relieve overtaxed state-court dockets.30 But I argue that by expanding the breadth of arbitration
and federal jurisdiction over state-court cases, federal courts have
compounded existing problems in state judiciaries. A state-tofederal shift allows businesses and institutional litigants to effectively opt out of state court in favor of arbitration or federal
courts. This alters the equilibrium of stakeholders in state courts,
with dynamic and negative consequences.
First, state courts may grow increasingly proplaintiff and federal courts prodefendant because repeat players are no longer
stuck at the state level; they can opt out.31 As businesses emigrate
from state to federal court, they leave behind a stakeholder pool
that is less corporate heavy and, eventually, more plaintiff
friendly. That is partly because as large businesses care less
about state litigation, they cede their repeat-player influence to
other stakeholders and focus mostly on lobbying federal courts
(even though, as I explain below, they maintain a significant interest in state judicial elections). State judges eager to retain
some litigation may then market their courts to plaintiffs’ attorneys, who in turn prefer heterogeneous state judiciaries from
which they have more opportunities to find friendly judges. In line
with this theory, I draw on significant evidence that defendant
firms generally prefer to litigate in federal court while plaintiffs’
attorneys side with state courts; that plaintiffs’ win rate in federal
court has collapsed since 1985; and that while federal courts have
adopted prodefendant procedural reforms, state courts have remained relatively proplaintiff.32 One concern is that such a stark
state-federal divergence can lead to a negative feedback loop:
prompted by allegations of state bias against defendants, the federal government increases its jurisdiction, only to turn state
courts even more proplaintiff and in need of further intervention.
In other words, as the federal judiciary expands to absorb state
cases, local courts end up inviting further federal action, leading
to a negative spiral.
Second, federalization means that businesses that used to be
repeat litigants in state court no longer have as much of a vested
30 See, for example, William W. Schwarzer and Russell R. Wheeler, On the Federalization of the Administration of Civil and Criminal Justice, 23 Stetson L Rev 651,
682 (1994).
31 See Part II.A.1.
32 See Part II.A.2. See also Alexandra D. Lahav and Peter Siegelman, The Curious
Incident of the Falling Win Rate: Individual vs System-Level Justification and the Rule of
Law, 52 UC Davis L Rev 1371, 1408–20 (2019).
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interest in the quality of local judiciaries, reducing any incentive
they had to lobby state legislatures for competent and well-funded
courts.33 Although normatively it may be a good thing for state
courts to lose prodefendant lobbying, businesses nonetheless retain an incentive to lobby for procorporate judges (especially in
judicial elections) and the state substantive law that follows them
to federal court (for example, tort reform). Due to federal expansion, businesses only lose the incentive to lobby for better courts.
This may partly explain one of the Article’s findings: that federalcourt budgets have grown much more than state-court budgets
recently.34 The main problem with this shift is that it carries distributional consequences and leads to a classic political economy
problem: while businesses are better off in federal court, remaining state-court litigants (including consumers, employees, and
those in family courts) are stuck with deteriorating state judiciaries. Society may lose the beneficial effect businesses had on
state courts yet retain the normatively worrisome effects of prodefendant and procorporate substantive law.
Third, federal monopolization of large state claims weakens
the ability of state courts to shape the common law. Because the
largest cases are increasingly litigated in federal court—including state-law claims under diversity or supplemental jurisdiction—the common law is stuck in a double bind: state courts have
less jurisdiction to change it and federal courts cannot engage
in innovative interpretations because of Erie Railroad Co v
Tompkins.35 This can lead to common-law stagnation. The Fifth
Circuit explicitly recognized this problem in December 2018 in
the context of a products-liability case against Apple, writing that
“where defendants operate nationwide in highly consolidated industries, like Apple in the smartphone industry, the rules governing federal courts in diversity cases may substantially close state
courts to novel claims. . . . The result may be a legal system less
generative than normal.” 36 To evaluate this dynamic, I review
preliminary evidence that federal courts are doing more work interpreting novel areas of state law.37
In sum, federal expansion has a vast array of effects on state
courts that are linked to economic and political dynamics. This
33
34
35
36
37

See Part II.B.1.
See Part I.C.
304 US 64 (1938). See Part II.C.
Meador v Apple, 911 F3d 260, 267 n 6 (5th Cir 2018).
See Part II.C.
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extended discussion of state courts is also timely—the federal judiciary’s efforts to reduce plaintiffs’ access to court (and the Supreme Court’s conservative tilt) means that legal struggles at the
federal level may migrate to state courts. And indeed, we are already seeing this turn to state courts. While the Supreme Court
recently decided that political gerrymandering is nonjusticiable,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court welcomed and adjudicated a
similar claim under state law in 2018.38 State courts thus have
the opportunity to seize this moment by opening access to justice.39 But this shift to state courts cannot blossom while state judiciaries are constrained by federal expansion, relatively low
budgets, insufficient political support, and “legislative assault” in
at least nineteen states.40 This Article ultimately seeks to highlight the importance of state courts so that they can regain their
vital role in shaping state and even federal law. After all, “For
most Americans, Lady Justice lives in the halls of state courts.”41
Given this state of affairs, the Article sketches a few potential
remedies for the relative decay of state courts. I suggest that the
federal government should fund state judiciaries with attached
conditions that focus on improvements. Such a proposal can be
structured carefully to avoid constitutional concerns. I also argue,
among other things, that state governments should continue to
create complex litigation courts.
Finally, a word about methods and limitations is in order.
The Article leverages data collected by the Administrative Office
of the United States Courts, the US Bureau of Justice Statistics,
and National Center for State Courts on cases in federal and state
courts, and state-court financial information. Moreover, I focus on
the law of civil procedure even though there is a universe of criminal cases that are hosted in the same courts. I leave criminal
cases aside mostly because they are not subject to the same
forum-shopping dynamics and involve different political economy
38 Compare Gill v Whitford, 138 S Ct 1916, 1934 (2018) (refusing to decide the issue
of justiciability of political gerrymandering); Rucho v Common Cause, 139 S Ct 2484,
2506–07 (2019), with League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania v Commonwealth, 175 A3d
282, 286 (Pa 2018) (Baer concurring and dissenting) (noting that the court did not stay
proceedings while Gill was pending or show restraint).
39 See, for example, Mitch Smith, North Carolina Judges Suspend Limit on Governor’s Powers (NY Times, Feb 8, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/3MFD-Q89D.
40 See notes 274–76; Legislative Assault on State Courts (Brennan Center for Justice,
Feb 11, 2019), archived at http://perma.cc/HC9Z-X95V.
41 John Schwartz, Critics Say Budget Cuts for Courts Risk Rights (NY Times, Nov
26, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/BT5T-5R2R (quoting former Colorado Supreme
Court Justice Rebecca Love Kourlis).
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considerations. That is another reason why I do not claim a strong
causal relationship between federalization and relative statecourt decay. I seek instead only to add a new consideration to an
existing basket of contributing causes.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I explores the three eras
of judicial federalism: from the 1789 partial integration of state
and federal courts all the way through the 1969 ALI plan and era
of Dual Judicial Sovereignty. A major contribution of this Article
is to then describe how after 1980, the country entered into a new
era of judicial federalism defined by federal expansion. This sets
the basis for an exploration of the effect of recent federal changes
on state courts. Thereafter, Parts II and III—the heart of the Article—draw on the political economy literature to argue that federal expansion can provide benefits but can also impose significant costs on state courts. Finally, Part IV suggests a few
potential remedies to improve the relationship between the federal government and state judiciaries.
I. THE HISTORY OF JUDICIAL FEDERALISM:
PARTIAL INTEGRATION, DUAL JUDICIAL SOVEREIGNTY, AND
FEDERAL EXPANSION
In this Part, I set the stage for the division of cases between
federal and state courts by exploring three historic episodes that
cover judicial federalism from 1789 to 2018. The boundaries between the three eras are fuzzy and arguably spanned decades.
But the point of this history is neither to search for some defining
line between true eras nor to develop a legal history framework—
rather, I simply aim to describe how attitudes toward federalstate court relations (and subject matter jurisdiction) have
evolved over time and how the post-1980 era is quite different
than what came before. This history also shows two common
themes.
First, there is a profound co-evolution and deep interconnectivity between federal question and diversity jurisdiction. In the
first era, federal question jurisdiction was anathema, constrained
by the 1789 Judiciary Act and vilified by states’-rights proponents
and Anti-Federalists. By contrast, diversity jurisdiction gave,
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according to Justice Joseph Story, “lasting satisfaction to the people.”42 In the Second Era, however, the roles flipped. Access to federal court became a savior for post–Civil War freedmen, federal
officials, and railroads—federal questions transformed into the
cornerstone of federal judicial power. Conversely, diversity jurisdiction and its relationship to corporate defendants became, according to Justice Frankfurter, “the mounting mischief inflicted
on the federal judicial system” and a target for progressives, the
ALI, and even the NAACP.43 One distinctive feature of the third
era is that anxieties about both diversity and federal question jurisdiction vanished and, for the first time, the federal government
aggressively appropriated state-court litigation and expanded
both types of jurisdiction. Indeed, Republicans seem enamored of
diversity jurisdiction as a way to fight plaintiffs’ attorneys.44
Second, political parties in the midst of political realignments
have given new constituencies access to federal court as a way to
consolidate emerging political coalitions.45 In the first era, federalists shielded interstate creditors—a central constituency of
their new political coalition—from state legislatures with diversity jurisdiction and access to federal courts staffed by federal
judges and urban juries. In the second era, radical Republicans
seeking to retain a political majority after the Civil War expanded
federal question jurisdiction over newly empowered freedmen and
interstate companies. Finally, in the third era, the Reagan administration embraced the corporate anti-litigation movement with
broad expansions of federal jurisdiction and a retrenched federal
procedural regime that made it more difficult for plaintiffs to file
claims or certify class actions. Although this gloss is only part of
a complex history of institutional change, drawing these links between broader political debates and procedural law shows that
jurisdiction, and related doctrines, can be a tool used by different
political groups to retain political power in uncertain times.

42 Joseph Story, 3 Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1686 at
564 (Hilliard 1833).
43 Lumbermen’s Mutual Casualty Co v Elbert, 348 US 48, 54 (1954) (Frankfurter
concurring).
44 See, for example, Linda S. Mullenix, The American Class Action Fairness Act and
Forum Shopping American-Style, 31 Geneva Papers 357, 360 (2006).
45 For a related institutional account of the development of judicial power, see generally Justin Crowe, Building the Judiciary: Law, Courts, and the Politics of Institutional
Development (Princeton 2012).
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The First Era: A Partially Integrated Judiciary (1789–1875)

The story of judicial federalism starts at the beginning of the
Republic. The Framers in 1789 envisioned a federal judiciary
charged with a limited caseload brought under the Supreme
Court’s “original” jurisdiction—affecting ambassadors, public
ministers, and cases in which a state is a party, a defined set of
cases in the Supreme Court’s appellate docket, 46 and a vague
promise of future “inferior courts” that could hear any claims arising under federal law.47 The Framers forcefully debated the constitutionality of these lower federal courts, ultimately settling for
Madison’s compromise to leave to Congress the choice whether to
create them.48 Unlike those heated debates, however, the Framers barely discussed federal courts’ diversity jurisdiction.49 And,
most importantly for our purposes, the 1789 Judiciary Act did not
even vest federal courts with federal question jurisdiction, severely cabining the number of cases in federal court.50 The Framers instead placed the burden of judicial work in the new nation
on state courts, expecting they would hear most state and federal
claims.51 This jurisdictional decision by itself defined the first era
and made it quite distinctive from what came after the Civil War.
At the center of Article III stood two somewhat contradictory
principles: a dual structure of separate federal and state courts
and an integrative principle that wove the two systems together.
Unlike countries with a unitary judiciary, the Constitution created a federal judiciary that would exist in parallel to state courts.
But despite this dualism, Article III enmeshed the two court systems. On the federal side, the Supreme Court had the power to
hear direct appeals from state courts on issues of federal law.52
The inferior federal courts were also empowered to hear claims
between residents of diverse states and original jurisdiction
claims not exclusively reserved to the Supreme Court.53 On the

46

US Const Art III, § 2.
US Const Art III, § 1.
48 Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and the Madisonian Compromise, 1995 Wis L Rev 39, 42. See also Records of the Federal Convention at 125 (cited
in note 12); Warren, 37 Harv L Rev at 65–66 (cited in note 12).
49 Friendly, 41 Harv L Rev at 484–87 (cited in note 15).
50 See, for example, Judiciary Act of 1789 §§ 9–12, 1 Stat 73, 76–80.
51 Hart, 66 Harv L Rev at 1401 (cited in note 12).
52 See Judiciary Act of 1789, § 25, 1 Stat 73, 85–87; Martin v Hunter’s Lessee, 14 US
304, 352–53 (1816) (holding that state-court decisions on issues of federal law “may be reexamined and reversed or affirmed in the supreme court of the United States”).
53 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch 20, §§ 9–12, 1 Stat 73, 76–80.
47
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state side, local judiciaries were bound by the Constitution under
the Supremacy Clause to apply federal law54 and were also trial
courts for most federal claims.55
The Framers need not have pursued partial integration. They
could have easily kept the systems apart, with no lower federal
courts at all or, alternatively, lower federal courts with exclusive
federal jurisdiction, no diversity provision, and no appellate review of state decisions on federal law.56 Indeed, the drafters of the
1789 Judiciary Act considered, but ultimately rejected, an early
proposal “that state courts should serve as federal inferior
courts.”57 But by enlisting state courts to enforce federal statutes,
the Framers pacified Anti-Federalist objections to federal jurisdiction.58 And, vice versa, by giving federal courts the power to
decide diversity cases, Federalists gave access to federal court to
one of their main constituencies: interstate creditors.59
Given the lack of any preexisting federal courts, most state
and federal judges were at the time of the founding, “more often
than not, the very same people.”60 Both state and federal judges
were originally appointed by the political branches for life tenure,61 and, not surprisingly, a large majority of the federal judges
confirmed in the early republic had “served as state court judges
either before, after, or both before and after their federal position.”62 Indeed, “State courts were the main source of Supreme
Court justices throughout the nineteenth century.” 63 Although

54

US Const Art VI, cl 2.
Henry M. Hart Jr, The Relations between State and Federal Law, 54 Colum L Rev
489, 498 (1954).
56 See Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two
Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 BU L Rev 205, 212 (1985) (“Article III plainly imposes no
obligation to create lower federal courts.”).
57 Julius Goebel Jr, 1 History of the Supreme Court of the United States: Antecedents
and Beginnings to 1801 470 (MacMillan 1971).
58 See Hart, 54 Colum L Rev at 498 (cited in note 55).
59 See Story, 3 Commentaries on the Constitution § 1685 at 607 (cited in note 42).
60 Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The Constitutionality of Federal Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation and the History of State Judicial Selection and Tenure, 98 Va L Rev 839,
891 (2012).
61 Id at 841–42.
62 Id at 891.
63 Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law 283 (Simon & Schuster 3d
ed 1973).
55
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the Compensation Act of 1789 set federal judicial salaries significantly higher than the average state judge,64 few prominent observers noted disparities in competence or ability. Justice Story
wrote in his Commentaries that “the judges of the state courts are,
and always will be, of as much learning, integrity, and wisdom,
as those of the courts of the United States.”65 The most important
modern difference between state and federal judges, judicial elections, came only in the 1830–1860 period when around twenty
state governments adopted elections as the predominant method
of judicial selection. 66 This development did, for the first time,
place a systematic distinction between state and federal courts.
Whatever critiques against federal jurisdiction existed during Founding-era debates, they were overtaken by a movement of
judges and lawyers intent on building a uniform commercial law
in both state and federal courts.67 To be sure, although this movement was only one side of the judicial federalism debate, it was
led by some of the most recognized judges of the era, including
Justice Story and New York’s Chancellor James Kent. 68 In the
Commentaries, Justice Story felt confident enough to write about
diversity jurisdiction that “[p]robably no part of the judicial power
of the Union has been of more practical benefit, or has given more
lasting satisfaction to the people,” and that it “has cherished a
mutual respect and confidence between the state and national
courts.” 69 Chancellor Kent similarly praised the 1789 Judiciary
Act as responsible for a system “so successful and so beneficial in
its operation, that the administration of justice in the federal
courts has been constantly rising in influence and reputation.”70

64 James E. Pfander, Judicial Compensation and the Definition of Judicial Power in
the Early Republic, 107 Mich L Rev 1, 20 (2008) (“Critics of generous salaries argued that
the figures exceeded the sums paid to state judges and were more than sufficient to attract
the best talent.”).
65 Story, 3 Commentaries on the Constitution § 1736 at 606 (cited in note 42).
66 See Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Economic Crisis and the Rise of Judicial Elections and Judicial Review, 123 Harv L Rev 1061, 1066 (2010).
67 This movement is why the Supreme Court allowed federal courts to create their
own general commercial law. See generally Swift v Tyson, 41 US (16 Pet) 1 (1842).
68 See Amalia D. Kessler, Inventing American Exceptionalism: The Origins of American Adversarial Legal Culture, 1800–1877 22–23, 45–48 (Yale 2017) (noting that while
Justice Story and Chancellor Kent were partially motivated by commercial concerns, they
were also motivated by moral and procedural aspects of equity and common law).
69
Story, 3 Commentaries on the Constitution § 1686 at 564 (cited in note 42). In
1833, the Force Bill allowed the removal of claims against federal officials for acts connected with taxation. Act of Mar 2, 1833, § 3, 4 Stat 633–34.
70 James Kent, 1 Commentaries on American Law 286 (O. Halsted 1826).
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On the whole, the first era seems to have been fairly stable,71
with a pro–state court bent, underpowered federal courts, and few
systematic differences between state and federal judges prior to
the wave of judicial elections.72 To be sure, much of this peace in
judicial relations was later upended by fugitive slave cases, Jacksonian hostility to an elite judiciary, and the Civil War.73 For our
purposes, however, the era was quite different than what came
later because the lack of plenary federal jurisdiction meant that
state courts had primary power over federal law. And even though
state courts were dominant, when federal judges dealt with cases
defining federal judicial power, they did not develop a language
of “deference” to state judiciaries.74
B.

The Second Era: Dual Judicial Sovereignty (1875–1980)

The long unfolding story of judicial federalism during the second era shows that federal courts clawed back power from state
courts but, simultaneously, found themselves under constant attacks for their expansive diversity jurisdiction.75 The second era
began with a flurry after the Civil War, when a Republican Congress pursued a five-part effort to shift power from state to federal
court through expansions to removal jurisdiction, habeas corpus
appeals, and bankruptcy jurisdiction, as well as the creation of
the US Court of Claims to host suits against the federal government.76 The federal legislative coup de grâce came in 1875, when
the Reconstruction Congress finally gave federal courts the plenary power to hear all cases presenting an issue of federal law—
so-called federal question jurisdiction—and expanded diversity
jurisdiction. 77 This decisive step toward the second era represented “Republican disenchantment with state courts,” because
71

Grove, 124 Harv L Rev at 889 (cited in note 2).
But see Friedman, A History of American Law at 119 (cited in note 63) (recognizing
that state courts had great leaders but “their spheres were less floodlit . . . than the great
federal courts”).
73 See generally Robert M. Cover, Justice Accused: Antislavery and the Judicial Process (Yale 1975). Jacksonian hostility arguably led to the Field Codes. See Stephen N.
Subrin, David Dudley Field and the Field Code: A Historical Analysis of an Earlier Procedural Vision, 6 Law & Hist Rev 311, 318 (1998).
74 Mary Brigid McManamon, Felix Frankfurter: The Architect of “Our Federalism”,
27 Ga L Rev 697, 700 (1993).
75 See Wiecek, 13 Am J Legal Hist at 338–39 (cited in note 3).
76 Id at 333–34. But see Conformity Act of 1872, ch 255, §§ 5–6, 17 Stat 196, 197
(instructing federal courts to follow state procedures in cases of law).
77 See Jurisdiction and Removal Act of 1875, § 2, 18 Stat 470, 470–71; Richard H.
Fallon Jr, et al, Hart & Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 745–46
72
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federal legislators “came to believe that local judges were trying
to thwart national policy,” especially protections for, at first, “federal officers and freedmen,” and later, interstate commerce and
railroads.78 In other words, the Act became “part and parcel of the
Republicans’ economic agenda”79 and political strategy. But even
then, federal question jurisdiction—the new cornerstone of federal judicial power—was limited by an amount-in-controversy requirement and faced repeated challenges from a Democratic
Party eager to weaken the new jurisdictional rules.80
With federal question jurisdiction flourishing in the late
1800s and early 1900s, diversity jurisdiction became embroiled in
battles between progressives and Lochner-era conservative federal courts.81 In the face of federal-court attacks on state regulation, progressive lawyers began to attack diversity jurisdiction as
a corporate tool.82 In turn, the Democratic Party’s long-term efforts against federal jurisdiction over corporate suits finally
earned support from progressive Republicans as well as judges
and legal scholars worried about docket control.83 A 1914 report
for the National Economic League prepared by, among others,
Professor Roscoe Pound and Justice Louis D. Brandeis, complained that “diversity jurisdiction” and differing legal interpretations between state and federal courts was an obstacle that had
“impaired the usefulness of the federal courts in some localities.”84
Two events then followed in the early 1920s that set the stage for
further technical complaints about judicial federalism. First,
the onset of prohibition in 1920 led to an unexpectedly large expansion of federal dockets, prompting anguish about overloaded

(Foundation 6th ed 2009). Though this was not an exclusive grant. Claflin v Houseman,
93 US 130, 136 (1876) (“[I]f exclusive jurisdiction be neither express nor implied, the State
courts have concurrent jurisdiction.”).
78 Wiecek, 13 Am J Legal Hist at 338, 342 (cited in note 3).
79 Grove, 124 Harv L Rev at 891–92 (cited in note 2).
80 Id at 893–94.
81 See Edward Purcell Jr, Brandeis and the Progressive Constitution: Erie, the Judicial Power, and the Politics of the Federal Courts in Twentieth-Century America 77–84
(Yale 2000). See generally Lochner v New York, 198 US 45 (1905).
82 See David Marcus, Erie, the Class Action Fairness Act, and Some Federalism Implications of Diversity Jurisdiction, 48 Wm & Mary L Rev 1247, 1269 (2007) (arguing that
diversity jurisdiction enabled “procorporate tendencies” in the Lochner era). See also
William M. Meigs, Decisions of the Federal Courts on Questions of State Law, 45 Am L Rev
47, 48 (1911) (criticizing the idea of “general commercial law”).
83 Grove, 124 Harv L Rev at 898–99 (cited in note 2).
84 Charles W. Eliot, et al, Preliminary Report on Efficiency in the Administration of
Justice 28 (National Economic League 1914).
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federal courts.85 Second, the Black and White Taxicab86 case—in
which the Supreme Court allowed a corporation to nakedly manufacture diversity jurisdiction—prompted state defenders and
progressives to lash out against federal courts.87
Both of these events unleashed a new set of federalism detractors and invited progressive scholars and judges wary of conservative federal judges to seize on the festering discontent.
Grasping the moment, in 1928 Judge Friendly produced a seminal article questioning the historical foundations of diversity jurisdiction, arguing that it was meant not as a bulwark against
state parochialism but only as protection for the creditor and
business class from in-state debtors. 88 A year later, Justice
Frankfurter released an influential piece pushing against corporate-friendly diversity jurisdiction, 89 which he later called “the
mounting mischief inflicted on the federal judicial system.”90 The
progressive critique of diversity thus solidified—it was a mischievous constitutional loophole that allowed exploitation of the
federal judiciary to benefit large businesses.91 This critique later
gained credence among a New Deal labor movement that was
categorically in favor of administrative regulation and against
privatized adjudication.92
The rising tide against diversity jurisdiction provoked both
victories and flops. Between 1928 and 1932, the Senate Judiciary
Committee produced three bills to, for the first time in the history

85 See William M. Wiecek, The Reconstruction of Federal Judicial Power, in Lawrence M. Friedman and Harry N. Schrieber, eds, American Law and the Constitutional
Order 237 (Harvard 1988); Caseloads: Criminal Cases, 1870–2017 (Federal Judicial Center), archived at http://perma.cc/CX3M-ZQKP.
86 Black and White Taxicab and Transfer Company v Brown and Yellow Taxicab and
Transfer Company, 276 US 518 (1928).
87 See id at 523–25 (holding that federal courts are not required to follow state
common-law precedents even if the defendant was forum shopping). Robert Post, Federalism in the Taft Court Era: Can It Be “Revived”?, 51 Duke L J 1513, 1598–99 & n 295 (2002).
88 Friendly, 41 Harv L Rev at 498–99 (cited in note 15).
89 See generally Frankfurter, 13 Cornell L Q 499 (cited in note 15).
90 Elbert, 348 US at 54 (Frankfurter concurring). See Frankfurter, 13 Cornell L Q at
520–21 (cited in note 15). In many ways, Frankfurter was the ideological “architect” of the
Second Era. McManamon, 27 Ga L Rev at 733 n 255 (cited in note 74) (“It was, after all,
Frankfurter who taught generations of Harvard law students, published countless books
and articles, and drafted virtually all the opinions that gave birth to ‘our federalism.’”).
91 Purcell, Brandeis and the Progressive Constitution at 77–78 (cited in note 81).
92 See David Freeman Engstrom, “Not Merely There to Help the Men”: Equal Pay
Laws, Collective Rights, and the Making of the Modern Class Action, 70 Stan L Rev 1,
64 (2018).
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of the republic, wholly abolish diversity jurisdiction.93 Progressive
Senator George W. Norris—a former state-court judge and later
cosponsor of the Norris-LaGuardia Act—masterminded all three
bills, doggedly pursuing diversity’s abolition for over a decade.94
Although Norris ultimately succeeded in curbing federal labor injunctions,95 his diversity bills never received a vote.96
But the antidiversity push found more success in the judiciary. In 1928, the Supreme Court introduced an early version of
what later became Younger v Harris 97 abstention, holding that
lower federal courts should relinquish jurisdiction in cases involving unsettled questions of state law.98 Then, in 1938, the Court’s
decision in Erie revolutionized the judicial system by forcing federal courts to decide diversity cases as if they were state courts.99
This was a direct strike against the core of diversity jurisdiction
and the founding era’s partial integration.100 Erie represented the
Supreme Court’s sweeping attempt to blunt forum shopping from
state to federal court and eliminate a major incentive for diversity
removal—the possibility of different substantive law.101 After Justice Frankfurter’s appointment to the Court in 1939, a new language of judicial federalism emerged. Only three years after Erie,
Justice Frankfurter weakened federal courts’ power over state
courts, holding in Toucey v New York Life Insurance Co102 that the
Anti-Injunction Act of 1793103 was a nearly absolute bar on federal
stays of state proceedings.104 Then in 1941, Justice Frankfurter

93 S 626, 70th Cong, 1st Sess 1 (Mar 27, 1928); S 691, 71st Cong, 2d Sess 1 (May 20,
1930); S 530, 72d Cong, 1st Sess 1 (Apr 7, 1932). See Jack H. Friedenthal, New Limitations
on Federal Jurisdiction, 11 Stan L Rev 213, 214 n 4 (1959). See also Purcell, Brandeis and
the Progressive Constitution at 83–84 (cited in note 81).
94 See Purcell, Brandeis and the Progressive Constitution at 77–85 (cited in note 81).
95 William E. Forbath, Law and the Shaping of the American Labor Movement 159–
62 (Harvard 1991); Luke P. Norris, Labor and the Origins of Civil Procedure, 92 NYU L
Rev 462, 506 (2017).
96 Brett W. Curry, The Courts, Congress, and the Politics of Federal Jurisdiction *103
(unpublished PhD dissertation, The Ohio State University, 2005), archived at
http://perma.cc/PE8L-ATL6.
97 401 US 37 (1971).
98 Gilchrist v Interborough Rapid Transit Co, 279 US 159, 207 (1929).
99 Erie, 304 US at 78. See also Daniel J. Meador, Concluding Remarks: National
Conference on State-Federal Judicial Relationships, 78 Va L Rev 1895, 1895 (1992).
100 See Louis H. Pollak, In Praise of Friendly, 133 U Pa L Rev 39, 51 (1984).
101 See Erie, 401 US at 76–77.
102 314 US 118 (1941).
103 Act of Mar 2, 1793, ch 22, § 5, 1 Stat 334–35.
104 Toucey, 314 US at 132.
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created a new robust concept of federal abstention with regard to
state-court cases.105
After Toucey and the abstention cases, a period of relative
calm set in for a decade, until Chief Justice Earl Warren called
for a reevaluation of judicial federalism in 1959. Fresh from
Brown v Board of Education106 and in the throes of southern “massive resistance,” the Chief was also concerned about an entirely
different villain: growing docket pressures on federal district
court judges. In an attempt to forestall the incoming flood, the
Chief called on the ALI to rethink the distribution of cases between the federal and state systems. 107 Chief Justice Warren
likely calculated that if federal courts focused on solving civil
rights cases and broader social issues, then whatever ensuing
docket concerns came to light could be alleviated by getting rid of
state law cases.108 In response to Chief Justice Warren’s call, the
ALI went through a ten-year study led by Herbert Wechsler that
culminated in a final 1969 report, titled “Study of the Division of
Jurisdiction between State and Federal Courts” (ALI Study).109
The ALI Study’s first proposal sought to place limits on diversity jurisdiction by prohibiting plaintiffs from bringing diversity cases in their own home states.110 The Study otherwise recommended a jurisdictional expansion over certain complex cases.
The second proposal was more radical. The Study not only reaffirmed the importance of federal question jurisdiction, but also
recommended enlarging it. The “basic principle is that federal
question jurisdiction is necessary to preserve uniformity in
federal law and to protect litigants relying on federal law from
the danger that state courts will not properly apply that law,
either through misunderstanding or lack of sympathy.” 111
The Study thus suggested the abolition of the federal claims
105 Railroad Commission of Texas v Pullman Co, 312 US 496, 501 (1941). See also
Burford v Sun Oil Co, 319 US 315, 332–33 (1943); Louisiana Power & Light Co v City of
Thibodaux, 360 US 25, 30 (1959) (reinstating a stay of a federal-court action pending a
decision by the Supreme Court of Louisiana on a novel question of state law).
106 347 US 483 (1954).
107 36 ALI Proceedings 27, 33 (May 20, 1959).
108 Notably, this civil rights impetus differed from Justice Frankfurter’s motivation,
which focused on the progressive movement’s battle against corporations. Indeed, Justice
Frankfurter was ambivalent about civil rights cases. This highlights an important dissonance in the second era that only grew wider after Chief Justice Warren Burger became
chief justice.
109 See generally ALI Study (cited in note 17).
110 Id at 109.
111 Id at 4.
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amount-in-controversy requirement and an expansion of federal
question jurisdiction. The overall plan was to achieve a massive
shift of around 50 percent of all diversity cases from federal court
to state courts, while simultaneously increasing cases relying
upon federal law.112
The ALI’s federal-state division of labor became the guiding
light for reformers. Its ethos for allocating cases in the federal
system posited, at its core, what I’d like to call a “Dual Judicial
Sovereignty” principle, which is defined by three notions: (1) each
court system, federal and state, has a comparative advantage
over cases addressing its own substantive law; (2) although the
First Era’s 1789 partially integrated structure explicitly blurred
the lines between the two systems, the demands of the twentiethcentury economy, and especially ballooning docket loads, requires
a relaxation of these statutory and constitutional doctrines; and
(3) coherence and uniformity of interpretation of substantive
law were more important than the mirage of beneficial crosspollination between the two court systems. These three principles
fueled congressional and judicial reforms.
Although the ALI’s proposal did not provoke immediate legislation, it set the stage for the next ten years of debates around
federal jurisdiction. Chief Justice Warren Burger took up the baton in 1973 when he declared in his “Report on the Federal Judicial Branch” that diversity jurisdiction had “no validity today.”113
Laying out an ambitious agenda to, again, restructure judicial
federalism, the Chief Justice called on Congress and the Judicial
Conference to take the lead. By the early 1970s, the long-feared
flood of cases had partly materialized. The Civil Rights Act of
1964, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (1966) (addressing class
actions), prisoner claims, employment cases, and environmental
statutes, among many others, were increasingly burdening an
overworked federal judiciary.114

112

Id at 6.
Warren E. Burger, Report on the Federal Judicial Branch, 59 ABA J 1125, 1126
(1973). This came after a decade of Warren Court rulings that represented a countertrend
against dual judicial sovereignty. Ronald J. Bacigal, The Federalism Pendulum, 98 W Va
L Rev 771, 783 (1996) (“[T]he Warren Court pushed the federalism pendulum to extend
federal constitutional protection of individual rights.”).
114 Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee *5 (Apr 2, 1990), archived at
http://perma.cc/9Q6P-RFSX.
113
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Both the Burger Court and Congress reacted to increasing
docket loads by reinventing judicial federalism.115 In a series of
cases aimed at empowering state courts, the Court created
and reaffirmed federal abstention doctrines (Colorado River, 116
Younger,117 Rooker-Feldman,118 etc.), weakened supplemental jurisdiction, and expanded the scope of state law.119 The House of
Representatives then followed on the Court’s heels, introducing
several bills in the early 1970s attempting to weaken diversity
jurisdiction and requiring state prisoners to exhaust state remedies before challenging their detention in federal court. 120 The
movement reached its peak in 1978, when the House overwhelmingly adopted a bipartisan bill that endeavored to wholly eliminate federal diversity jurisdiction.121 By then, an impressive array
of institutions and interests had lined up behind the effort: President Jimmy Carter, Attorney General Griffin Bell, Chief Justice
Burger, the Judicial Conference, and the National Conference of
State Chief Justices (claiming to be “ready” for cases to return
where they rightfully belonged).122 The bill even had the backing
of the NAACP and the ACLU.123

115 A series of legal articles in the 1970s recognized the revolutionary nature of the
courts’ abstention doctrines. See, for example, Weinberg, 29 Stan L Rev at 1203 (cited in
note 1) (noting that the Burger Court relied on “principles of federalism” to address increasing caseloads).
116 See generally Colorado River Water Conservation District v United States, 424 US
800 (1976).
117 See generally Younger v Harris, 401 US 37 (1971).
118 See generally Rooker v Fidelity Trust Co, 263 US 413 (1923); District of Columbia
Court of Appeals v Feldman, 460 US 462 (1983).
119 See Colorado River, 424 US at 817; Younger, 401 US at 43–44; Huffman v Pursue,
Ltd, 420 US 592, 611–12 (1975); Feldman, 460 US at 482–83; Boehning v Indiana State
Employees Association, Inc, 423 US 6, 8 (1975); Rizzo v Goode, 423 US 362, 378 (1976);
Askew v Hargrave, 401 US 476, 478 (1971); De Canas v Bica, 424 US 351, 357 (1976)
(deferring to state regulation); Kewanee Oil Co v Bicron Corp, 416 US 470, 493 (1974)
(same); Askew v American Waterways Operators, Inc, 411 US 325, 344 (1973) (same). Many
of these abstention doctrines prevented not only the rise of state law cases in federal court,
but federal claims too.
120 Robert J. Sheran and Barbara Isaacman, State Cases Belong in State Courts, 12
Creighton L Rev 1, 28 (1978).
121 The House passed HR 9622 abolishing diversity jurisdiction on February 28, 1978.
See HR 9622, 95th Cong, 2d Sess (Feb 28, 1978), in 122 Cong Rec 1569.
122 Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1979, Hearings on S 679 before the Committee
on the Judiciary, 96th Cong, 1st Sess 37 (1979) (1979 JAA Hearings) (statement of
Chief Justice Robert J. Sheran, Supreme Court of Minnesota); id at 5 (statement of Sen
Metzenbaum).
123 Curry, The Courts at *150 (cited in note 96).
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With this overwhelming support, the bill to abolish diversity
jurisdiction reached the Senate floor in 1979. To welcome it, Senator Ted Kennedy opened debate by noting that “[t]oo many cases
now clogging the Federal courts involve issues of State law that
would be better heard and resolved by our State courts. Abolition
of Federal diversity jurisdiction is a States’ rights issue; State
courts should decide State cases while Federal courts should retain jurisdiction over Federal matters.” 124 Other senators welcomed this crisp statement of the Dual Judicial Sovereignty principle.125 But despite this impressive backing, the floor vote never
arrived. The bill did not gather sufficient support. And try as
many reformers did over the next two decades, they could not revive the push against diversity.
The movement ran into opposition from three groups. First,
defenders of the status quo argued that diversity cases accounted
for only a small percentage of the federal docket and were thus
not problematic. 126 Why fix this nonexistent issue? Second, the
powerful Association of Trial Lawyers of America and its supporting congressmen claimed that diversity jurisdiction was part of
the American tradition, promoted convenience, increased access
to justice, and provided federal-state cross-pollination.127 Many in
this camp also appealed to diversity jurisdiction as a safety valve
against the prejudice of local courts. 128 Finally, Senator Strom
Thurmond and others voiced a concern that foisting thousands of
diversity cases on overburdened state courts would actually strike
a blow against access to justice by increasing delays.129 With these
arguments, supporters of diversity jurisdiction carried the day.
So ended the second era of judicial federalism, with a whimper. Critically, although arguments for shifting work to state
courts advanced different values at different times—progressives
124 1979 JAA Hearings, 96th Cong, 1st Sess at 1 (cited in note 122) (statement of Sen
Kennedy).
125 See, for example, id at 4–7 (statements of Sen Metzenbaum and Chief Justice
Sheran).
126 But see John P. Frank, Federal Diversity Jurisdiction—An Opposing View, 17 SC
L Rev 677, 679–80 (1965).
127 Sheran and Isaacman, 12 Creighton L Rev at 30 & n 148 (cited in note 120), citing
Federal Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction, Hearings on S 2094, S 2389, and HR 9622
before the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, 95th Cong, 2d Sess 140 (statement of Association of Trial Lawyers of
America).
128 1979 JAA Hearings, 96th Cong, 1st Sess at 3 (cited in note 122) (statement of Sen
Thurmond).
129 Id.
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were wary of Lochner, New Dealers favored regulation instead of
adjudication, the Warren Court wanted to focus on civil rights
cases, and the Burger Court wanted to offload those cases—there
was a consistent struggle against large and diversity-fueled
federal-court dockets. That was a noticeable shift from the first
era. After 1979, however, there were no other even remotely successful efforts to abolish diversity jurisdiction. Instead, diversity
made a roaring comeback.
C.

The Third Era: Federal Expansion (1980–Present)

In this Section, I focus on the pre- and post-1980 federal reforms that expanded federal jurisdiction. The term “federal expansion” refers here specifically to federal appropriation of statelaw claims and federal claims that used to be litigated in state
courts.130 There are several reasons why 1980 likely marks the beginning of the third era, but a single one suffices: that was the
year that Congress finally eliminated the amount-in-controversy
requirement for federal question jurisdiction.131 This represented
the culmination of two-hundred-year-old statutory restrictions on
federal judicial control over federal law. After that change, other
reforms followed, ranging from procedural minutiae all the way
to substantive statutory reforms. The central feature of this new
era is that unlike the first two, after 1980, federal officials, judges,
and large businesses began to simultaneously champion both diversity and federal question jurisdiction as a way to federalize
state-court cases.
To be clear, although 1980 marks the beginning of the era, it
does not represent a decisive break. The recent state-to-federal
shift has sometimes ebbed and hasn’t always been unidirectional;
sometimes the states have reclaimed judicial power. 132 Federal
courts and Congress have at times even surrendered jurisdiction
in a variety of ways, including by constraining federal question
jurisdiction and standing doctrine, and by enacting jurisdictionstripping legislation.133 All of these cases and statutes represent
a significant countertrend in the midst of the third era.
130 This is only one kind of expansion. It does not refer to a generalized and comprehensive expansion of federal jurisdiction over all possible claims (state or federal).
131 Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980, Pub L No 96-486, 94
Stat 2369, codified at 28 USC § 1331.
132 See note 289 and accompanying text.
133 See generally, for example, Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc v Thompson, 478 US
804 (1986); Gunn v Minton, 568 US 251 (2013). See also Spokeo, Inc v Robins, 136 S Ct
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Setting aside these few exceptions, however, the thrust of the
third era has been expansion. The 1970s and 1980s procedural
political economy defeated the second pillar of the ALI’s plan—
returning state-law cases to state court. Instead, the federal government launched a third era composed of three parts: federalization of areas previously governed by state law, including state
class actions; the concentration of monetarily significant claims
in federal court; and the decay of state courts. Below, I describe
these changes thematically because the federal government has
moved through these reforms in a nonprogrammatic fashion.
1. Expanding federal law and supplemental jurisdiction.
The federal government has employed a variety of mechanisms to concentrate federal claims in federal court and displace
related state-law claims. Rather than constituting solely a change
in which government controls the relevant primary conduct,
many federal statutes have shifted the adjudicative forum.134 The
third era reforms discussed in this Section involve four coherent
and self-reinforcing changes: (1) new federal causes of action that
can (2) comfortably call on federal courts’ federal jurisdiction or
(3) be easily removed from state courts and can (4) be paired with
state-law claims under the supplemental jurisdiction doctrine.
These changes have mostly been motivated by the desire for uniform national regulation135 and a political economy in which businesses favor the federal judiciary. 136 Of course, many of these
changes have come in areas that have been federal for quite a long
time. Nonetheless, recent federal expansion has been unusual
and has gone through these four related steps:
First, Congress has enacted federal statutes with private
rights of action in areas previously dominated by state law.137 Just

1540, 1545 (2016); Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub
L No 104-132, 110 Stat 1214, codified as amended in various sections of Title 28. These
changes are of a piece with broader efforts to close the federal courthouse doors to a wide
variety of claims. See Parts I.C.2; I.C.5; Alexander v Sandoval, 532 US 275, 291 (2001).
134 Issacharoff and Sharkey, 53 UCLA L Rev at 1359 (cited in note 10).
135 Id at 1368.
136 See Part II.A.
137 Committee on Long Range Planning of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts *37 (Dec 15, 1995), archived at
http://perma.cc/W2VR-WYKB (Long Range Plan). Professors Samuel Issacharoff and
Catherine Sharkey have discussed this area of the law extensively. See generally
Issacharoff and Sharkey, 53 UCLA L Rev (cited in note 10).
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in the last few decades, Congress has legislated in areas like products liability, 138 employee benefits, 139 copyright, 140 regulation
and maintenance of ships, 141 airline-carrier liability, 142 labormanagement relations,143 worker safety,144 and trade secret protection.145 In the environmental law context alone, there has been
a federal statutory revolution. The Clean Water Act146 by itself
preempted state common law claims of nuisance and property
damage.147
Federalization of state law edged even closer to the core work
of state courts: torts and contracts.148 At the end of the second era,
Congress created significant legislative slack that the judiciary
later seized on, and Congress itself expanded, in the third era. In
the realm of mass torts, federal statutes like the National Traffic
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 149 the Public Health Cigarette
Smoking Act of 1970,150 the Medical Device Amendments,151 and
expansive interpretations of even older laws like the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 152 have either preempted traditional state claims or given plaintiffs an added federal claim to

138 See, for example, Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub L No 89-92, 79 Stat
282 (1965), codified as amended at 15 USC § 1331 et seq.
139 See, for example, Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), Pub L
No 93-406, 88 Stat 829 (1974), codified in various sections of Title 26 and Title 29.
140 See, for example, Copyright Act, Pub L No 94-553, 90 Stat 2541 (1976), codified as
amended in 17 USC §§ 101–810. To be sure, this movement started in the New Deal.
141 See, for example, Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 (PWSA), Pub L No 92340, 86 Stat 424, codified at 33 USC §§ 1221–1232a, partially repealed by Pub L No 115282, 132 Stat 4264 (2018).
142 See, for example, Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transport by Air, 49 Stat 3000, Treaty Ser No 876 (1929).
143 See, for example, Labor-Management Relations Act (LMRA), 61 Stat 136 (1947),
codified as amended at 29 USC § 151 et seq.
144 See, for example, Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), Pub L No 91-596,
84 Stat 1590 (1970), codified as amended at 29 USC §§ 651–678.
145 See, for example, Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (DTSA), Pub L No 114-153,
130 Stat 376, codified at 18 USC § 1836 et seq.
146 Pub L No 92-500, 86 Stat 816 (1972), codified as amended at 33 USC §§ 1251
et seq.
147 See Issacharoff and Sharkey, 53 UCLA L Rev at 1380–81 (cited in note 10).
148 See generally, for example, Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption:
An Institutional Approach, 76 Geo Wash L Rev 449 (2008); Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DePaul L Rev
227 (2007).
149 Pub L No 89-563, 80 Stat 718 (1966), codified as amended at 15 USC § 1381 et seq.
150 Pub L No 91-22, 84 Stat 87 (1970), codified at 15 USC § 1340.
151 Pub L No 94-295, 90 Stat 539 (1976), codified at 21 USC §§ 360c–379a.
152 52 Stat 1040 (1938), codified as amended at 21 USC §§ 301 et seq.
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flood federal courts with tort disputes.153 In all of these, Congress
sought to provide new regulatory regimes to either extinguish tort
claims or allow federal courts and regulators to substitute for
state courts.
Adding power to this statutory blunderbuss, Supreme Court
decisions on the Commerce Clause, abstention, and preemption
have sided with federal power over state common law.154 As Professor Daniel Meltzer noted in the heyday of the Rehnquist Court,
in statutory preemption cases “the Supreme Court has been willing to recognize in the federal courts a broad lawmaking power,
based upon policy judgments about how best to further the purposes of federal enactments.”155 The Rehnquist Court interpreted
federal statutes expansively, covering areas like labor and employment, economic regulation, transportation, health, safety, environmental regulation, and arbitration.156 These expansive anti–
state law decisions extended even to areas without federal legislation. For example, in Boyle v United Technologies Corp,157 the
Court held that federal courts could displace state tort claims in
suits against federal contractors even in the absence of a controlling statute.158 Although the Court at times constrained federal
legislative power, it simultaneously promoted federal expansion
through its field and implied preemption holdings, allowing federal regulation to displace state common law. 159 Professors
Michael Greve and Jonathan Klick, for example, have found that
153 Issacharoff and Sharkey, 53 UCLA L Rev at 1412–13 (cited in note 10). See, for
example, Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act Amendment of 1984, Pub L
No 98-426, 98 Stat 1639 (1988), codified as amended at 33 USC § 901 et seq; Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988, Pub L No 100-694, 102 Stat
4563, codified in various sections of Title 28. But see Robert Rabin, Federalism and the
Tort System, 50 Rutgers L Rev 1, 4–5 (1997) (arguing that Congress had not yet enacted
a national tort reform agenda).
154 Michael S. Greve and Jonathan Klick, Preemption in the Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Empirical Assessment, 14 S Ct Econ Rev 43, 84–88 (2006) (empirically analyzing
the Rehnquist Court’s preemption decisions); Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court’s Judicial Passivity, 2002 S Ct Rev 343, 369–70 (finding that since Justice Clarence Thomas
joined the Court, the Court has held state laws preempted in two-thirds of preemption
cases).
155 Meltzer, 2002 S Ct Rev at 344 (cited in note 154). But see Greve and Klick, 14 S
Ct Econ Rev at 47 (cited in note 154) (finding no “decisional trend”).
156 Greve and Klick, 14 S Ct Econ Rev at 50–51 (cited in note 154).
157 487 US 500 (1988).
158 Id at 504.
159 See Meltzer, 2002 S Ct Rev at 367 & n 104 (cited in note 154). But see Cipollone v
Liggett Group, Inc, 505 US 504, 517 (1991) (rejecting an implied preemption claim because
“Congress’ enactment of a provision defining the pre-emptive reach of a statute implies
that matters beyond that reach are not pre-empted”).
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tort cases comprised “nearly 40 percent of the [Rehnquist Court
preemption] case universe” and the Court preempted state tort
claims in 62.5 percent of those cases.160 The Roberts Court has
cheerfully continued this trend with expansive preemption rulings and even attempts to neuter abstention doctrines developed
in the 1970s.161
Second, Congress and the Supreme Court invigorated these
new federal statutes by construing federal question jurisdiction
broadly.162 The Court had long understood federal jurisdiction to
exist when a well-pleaded complaint stated a federal issue. But
there was also federal jurisdiction when some “disputed question
of federal law [became] a necessary element of one of the wellpleaded state claims.”163 Despite this expansive language, practical limitations like an amount-in-controversy requirement of
$10,000 and the lack of a statutory cause of action constrained
the reach of federal jurisdiction.164 In the past few decades, however, Congress and the Court have set these constraints aside.
Congress in 1976 eliminated the federal amount-in-controversy
requirement for claims against the United States,165 and then in
1980 scrapped it entirely.166 Decades later, the Court supported
the idea that a state law case can nonetheless “arise under” federal question jurisdiction in Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc v
Darue Engineering & Manufacturing.167 In that case, the Court
allowed the removal of a state-law quiet-title claim because it was
inextricably tied up with a federal tax title provision, a sufficient
federal “ingredient” in the claim.168 Some evidence suggests that
this decision opened federal jurisdiction to state claims bound up
with a federal statute.169

160

Greve and Klick, 14 S Ct Econ Rev at 52 (cited in note 154).
See Catherine M. Sharkey, The Administrative State and the Common Law: Regulatory Substitutes or Complements?, 65 Emory L J 1705, 1733 (2016). See also, for example, Exxon Mobil Corp v Saudi Basic Industries Corp, 544 US 280, 292–93 (2005).
162 Issacharoff and Sharkey, 53 UCLA L Rev at 1410–14 (cited in note 10).
163 Franchise Tax Board of California v Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for
Southern California, 463 US 1, 13 (1983).
164 See note 80 and accompanying text.
165 Act of Oct 21, 1976, Pub L No 94-574, 90 Stat 2721, codified as amended at 5 § USC
702, 703.
166 See Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980, Pub L No 96-486,
94 Stat 2369, codified as amended at 28 USC § 1331.
167 545 US 308 (2005).
168 Id at 315.
169 Compare Issacharoff and Sharkey, 53 UCLA L Rev at 1414 (cited in note 10) (“Grable has reinvigorated federal question jurisdiction.”), with Empire Healthchoice Assurance,
161
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Third, to complete the expansion of federal jurisdiction, the
Court and Congress strengthened the power of defendants to remove claims from state to federal court. Under the well-pleaded
complaint rule, a claim was removable only if there was a federal
cause of action in the plaintiffs’ complaint.170 A federal defense
would not suffice. But in 1983 the Court expanded a little-known
exception for federal defenses that “completely pre-empt[ ]” a
state cause of action.171 This allowed the removal of state claims
necessarily tied up with a preempting federal claim. The Court
then went out of its way to bless and expand the use of this newfangled exception.172 Even more, the Court has developed a series
of doctrines related to waiver of the right to remand a case back
to state court “that are strongly skewed against plaintiffs and in
favor of federal-court adjudication, even in cases that raise only
substantive state law issues.”173 Perhaps most importantly, in the
1988 Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, 174 Congress significantly eased the mechanistic process of removal.175
The Act eliminated hurdles that stood in the way of removal, including the submission of a notarized petition and the required
posting of a bond.176 As explained below, all of these complementary reforms may have contributed to an increase in removal
rates.177
Finally, the expansion of federal law, federal question jurisdiction, and removal is even more relevant to the question of forum because of the concomitant growth of supplemental jurisdiction over state claims. In 1990, Congress adopted an expansive
supplemental jurisdiction statute that, for the first time, covered

Inc v McVeigh, 547 US 677, 699 (2006) (noting that Grable is in a “special and small
category”).
170 Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 US at 9–10.
171 Id at 23–24.
172 See A. Benjamin Spencer, Anti-Federalist Procedure, 64 Wash & Lee L Rev 233,
252–54 (2007) (criticizing the Courts’ expansion upon the exception established in Construction Laborers Vacation Trust in Beneficial National Bank v Anderson, 539 US
1 (2004)).
173 Joan Steinman, Waiving Removal, Waiving Remand—The Hidden and Unequal
Dangers of Participating in Litigation, 71 Fla L Rev 689, 692 (2019).
174 Pub L No 100-702, 102 Stat 4642 (1988), codified as amended in various sections
of Title 28.
175 Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act § 1016, 102 Stat at 4669–70.
176 See HR Rep No 100-889, 100th Cong, 2d Sess 71 (1988).
177 See Christopher Terranova, Erroneous Removal as a Tool for Silent Tort Reform:
An Empirical Analysis of Fee Awards and Fraudulent Joinder, 44 Willamette L Rev 799,
805–09 (2008).
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both pendent parties and pendent claims.178 Although Congress
provided exceptions for “claim[s] rais[ing] a novel or complex issue of State law,”179 the Supreme Court has interpreted the statute as a “broad grant of supplemental jurisdiction” over state
claims, including over class action members who do not independently meet diversity requirements.180
All four of these steps involve self-reinforcing changes aimed
at concentrating more cases in federal court, along with any supplemental state-law claims: congressional enactment of federal
causes of action that can be filed jointly with state claims, an expansive reading of federal question jurisdiction over those new
statutes, doctrinal and statutory amendments that eased removal, and a related enlargement of supplemental jurisdiction
over state-law claims.
To evaluate whether the federal docket reflects a change in
the number of federal cases, I collected figures from the Administrative Office about docket loads. As explored in Figure 1 below,
federal dockets show that the overall number of civil cases in federal court has grown from 168,105 in 1980 to 242,972 in 2014:181
FIGURE 1: FEDERAL COURT CASES182
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178 Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub L No 101-650, 104 Stat 5089, codified as
amended in various sections of Title 28.
179 Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 § 1367(c)(1), 104 Stat at 5113.
180 Exxon Mobil Corp v Allapattah Services, Inc, 545 US 546, 547 (2005).
181 Data from the Coase-Sandor Institute on file with author.
182 The chart excludes a third group of cases against the federal government.
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Accounting for population and economic growth, the expansion is moderate. It may have also flatlined since in the mid1990s. Despite this apparently flat trend, federal expansion has
been mostly about the composition of docket loads, not the sheer
number of cases. The third era, therefore, should have produced
an increase in the percentage of cases based on federal question
jurisdiction (especially if many state claims now reach federal
court through supplemental jurisdiction or diversity class actions). This change in composition is exactly what we observe in
Figure 2 below:
FIGURE 2: FEDERAL QUESTION CASES AS A PERCENTAGE OF ALL
FEDERAL CASES183
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There are a few ways to interpret this growth. One possibility
is that federal cases have expanded in both state and federal
courts. But there is no evidence that this has happened.184 The
most straightforward reading seems to be that federal expansion
has succeeded. The federal docket is increasingly composed of federal question cases, going from 42 percent in 1980 to 75 percent

183 State cases were omitted from the total number of cases because it would be difficult to determine whether each case was removed based on diversity or federal question
jurisdiction.
184 But see Daniel J. Meador, Federal Law in State Supreme Courts, 3 Const Comment 347, 358–61 (1986).

2132

The University of Chicago Law Review

[86:2101

in 1995 and 56 percent in 2014. To be sure, diversity jurisdiction
is the most direct path for state-law claims to access federal
courts. As I explore in the next Section, however, after the Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005185 (CAFA), there is reason to believe
that the number of diversity cases (around sixty thousand a year)
understates their significance; the diversity docket is now populated by increasingly large class actions and actually represents
millions of state-law claims. This only reinforces the success of
federal expansion.
Relatedly, at least four related empirical trends support the
idea that state claims are increasingly flooding federal courts.
First, removal rates as a percentage of all diversity cases have
shot up since 1988–1990. 186 Those years overlap precisely with
many of the changes discussed above.187 An increase in removals
offers evidence of a state to federal shift in forum; those cases
might have otherwise remained in state court but for federal jurisdiction. Moreover, there is an increasing gap between removal
rates and remands since at least 2001.188 The numbers imply that
defendants increasingly prefer to litigate in a federal forum and
have a higher likelihood of remaining there. At the very least, the
data line up with congressional goals.
Second, federal docket compositions reflect a rise in tort, contract, and labor cases since 1980 (as well as prisoner and civil
rights claims).189 To be sure, we should examine these data with
caution because the coding methods used by the Administrative
Office are not always reliable over time.190 With that said, tort
cases went from 17 percent of the federal civil docket in 1986 to
an impressive 24 percent in 2013, becoming the largest type of

185

Pub L No 109-2, 119 Stat 4, codified in various sections of Title 28.
Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 Notre Dame L Rev 1919, 1923–
26, 1926 (2009) (see Figure 1).
187 Id; Terranova, 44 Willamette L Rev at 799, 805–09 (cited in note 177).
188 See Clermont, 84 Notre Dame L Rev at 1925–26 (cited in note 186) (see Figure 1).
189 See Patricia W. Hatamyar Moore, The Civil Caseload of the Federal District
Courts, 2015 U Ill L Rev 1177, 1180.
190 See Christina L. Boyd and David A. Hoffman, The Use and Reliability of Federal
Nature of Suit Codes, 2017 Mich St L Rev 997, 1006–07.
186
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case.191 At the same time, according to at least one study, tort filings notably declined in state courts.192 State-law cases predominate in the 96 percent of multidistrict-litigation claims that fall
into the “mass-tort” category. 193 Contract cases, for their part,
have also increased since 1980, though they peaked around
1990. 194 Most of this rise and then flattening seems to be explained by business-to-business litigation moving from state to
federal court after the 1950s.195 Moreover, Fair Labor Standards
Act cases have increased significantly in federal dockets since
the 1980s.196
Third, all of these new federal cases are even more important
because they can be filed alongside supplemental state-law
claims. And, as I explore in the next Section, there is significant
evidence from several different studies that a large percentage of
federal claims in federal court include supplemental state-law
claims.197
Finally, the recent dramatic rise in state certification statutes is a telling sign that state-law claims have been flooding federal courts. While Florida adopted the first certification statute
in 1945,198 the Supreme Court only blessed the certification process in 1974—vacating and remanding a lower court judgment so
that it could certify an unsettled question of state law to the
Florida supreme court. 199 By 1976, however, only fifteen states
had a certification statute.200 Since then, a wave of twenty-eight
states have adopted statutes explicitly embracing certification,
especially around the late 1980s and mid-1990s.201 The fact that
191 Moore, 2015 U Ill L Rev at 1212 (cited in note 189) (see Table 5). See also Marc
Galanter, Contract in Court; or Almost Everything You May or May Not Want to Know
about Contract Litigation, 2001 Wis L Rev 577, 598.
192 See R. LaFountain, et al, Examining the Work of State Courts: An Analysis of 2008
State Court Caseloads *27 (National Center for State Courts, 2010), archived at
http://perma.cc/H3SX-2GTF.
193 Andrew D. Bradt, “A Radical Proposal”: The Multidistrict Litigation Act of 1968,
165 U Pa L Rev 831, 844 n 58 (2017).
194 Galanter, 2001 Wis L Rev at 584 (cited in note 191) (see Figure 2).
195 Id at 586.
196 Moore, 2015 U Ill L Rev at 1233 (cited in note 189) (see Figure 13). See also FJC
Study.
197 See note 239.
198 Michael Klotz, Avoiding Inconsistent Interpretations: United States v. Kelly, the
Fourth Circuit, and the Need for a Certification Procedure in North Carolina, 49 Wake
Forest L Rev 1173, 1174–75 (2014).
199 See generally Lehman Brothers v Schein, 416 US 386 (1974).
200 Klotz, 49 Wake Forest L Rev at 1174–75 (cited in note 198).
201 Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States: Positivism and
Judicial Federalism after Erie, 145 U Pa L Rev 1459, 1548 n 472 (1997).
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nearly all state legislatures suddenly felt a need to adopt certification statutes in the midst of the third era is suggestive of federal expansion over state claims.
In sum, the government successfully promoted the ALI’s plan
to concentrate federal cases in federal court and also engaged in
systematic expansion over state claims. To be sure, not all the
data point that way. For example, prisoner petitions and civil
rights claims do account for a significant rise in the number of
cases in federal court since 1986. Nonetheless, the thrust of the
last few decades has been toward considerable federalization of
state law.
2. Expanding federal control of state class actions.
Although the ALI apparently succeeded in its first goal of concentrating federal cases in federal court, it mostly failed in its second goal of reining in diversity jurisdiction. In this Section, I explore how this failure was mostly due to political pressures that
led to the federalization of state class actions. Between 1998 and
2005, Congress pursued broad-reaching statutes—especially
CAFA and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act 202
(SLUSA)—with a single purpose in mind: the removal of large
class action cases from state to federal court. As I discuss here,
the motivation behind these statutes had been building for decades. Parallel to the ALI’s goal of Dual Judicial Sovereignty, corporate defendants and conservative groups demanded federal intervention against “out of control” state courts, and the federal
government mostly complied. These developments meant that the
partisan valence of federalism flipped at some point in the
1980s, when conservative forces began to see federal courts as
friendlier to their claims.203 Although conservative forces led the
anti-litigation movement, they at times received significant support from liberals who were anxious about docket loads in the
mass-tort era,204 representing a broad anti-litigation push in the
federal courts.

202

Pub L No 105-353, 112 Stat 3227 (1998).
See Karen O’Connor and Lee Epstein, Rebalancing the Scales of Justice: Assessment of Public Interest Law, 7 Harv J L & Pub Pol 483, 494 (1984).
204 See Stephen B. Burbank and Sean Farhang, Litigation Reform: An Institutional
Approach, 162 U Pa L Rev 1543, 1558–59 (2014).
203
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Like in federal courts, litigation in state court flourished in
the late 1960s and 1970s.205 New progressive groups took full advantage of statutory private rights of action to create the field of
public interest litigation, covering areas like products liability,
environmental protection, women’s rights, and civil rights.206 This
cottage industry of plaintiffs’ lawyers and the statutes that empowered them built the so-called litigation state—a uniquely
American reliance on publicly oriented litigation to effect social
policy.207 This litigation state boomed in both federal and state
courts.208
A combination of increased regulatory activity from federal
agencies and expansive litigation provoked a political backlash.
Early critiques of blossoming state litigation surfaced in the
1970s, as newly regulated businesses and trade associations took
aim at the courts.209 These business groups attacked not only the
kinds of statutory claims they were facing, but also the very legitimacy of public-law litigation in the first place. Figures like Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr and Professor Edwin Meese began to assemble a comprehensive critique of litigation as harmful to
businesses, the economy, and the public.210 Meese’s Pacific Legal
Foundation (PLF), for example, created novel litigation strategies
to blunt the force of environmental claims and environmental protection groups.211 Seeing the success of this legal resistance, large
businesses and foundations emulated the PLF and increased financial donations to conservative legal groups. These groups, in
turn, began to focus on class actions as responsible for blurring
the distinction “between law and politics” and for fueling “political change in the courts.”212

205 See, for example, Department of Justice, Report of the Tort Policy Working Group
on the Causes, Extent and Policy Implications of the Current Crisis in Insurance Availability and Affordability *80 (Feb 1986), archived at http://perma.cc/F74X-AXTN.
206 O’Connor and Epstein, 7 Harv J L & Pub Pol at 493–94 (cited in note 203).
207 Sean Farhang, The Litigation State: Public Regulation and Private Lawsuits in
the United States 60, 64–65 (Princeton 2010); Robert A. Kagan, Adversarial Legalism: The
American Way of Law 6–7, 9 (Harvard 2001).
208 See Zambrano, 70 Stan L Rev at 1847–50 (cited in note 9). See also Robert A.
Kagan, et al, The Evolution of State Supreme Courts, 76 Mich L Rev 961, 973,
980–83 (1978).
209 O’Connor and Epstein, 7 Harv J L & Pub Pol at 493–94 (cited in note 203).
210 Id at 494–95.
211 Id at 495–96.
212 David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part II: Litigation and
Legitimacy, 1981–1994, 86 Fordham L Rev 1785, 1788 (2018).
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This emerging battle between public-law liberal groups and
conservative probusiness backlash fueled the Reagan administration’s litigation reform efforts in the early 1980s.213 Among other
things, the administration embraced the anti-litigation movement and explicitly sought “fundamental change to the American
product liability system through the federalization of [state] substantive law.”214 Three terms of Republican presidents intent on
appointing conservative judges committed to litigation reform
had a few predictable effects on federal courts. First, a significant
slice of the federal judiciary fell into a “‘crisis mentality’ with regard to mass-tort claims,” worried that increasing numbers of
cases would cripple the courts.215 Second, as a result, a mix of federal circuit judges and justices (from both parties) lashed out
against class actions in the 1990s, rigorously policing choice-oflaw problems216 and repudiating the use of nationwide class actions.217 Third, federal courts began a systematic effort at procedural retrenchment aimed at closing access to federal court by
constricting discovery, personal jurisdiction, and class actions,
among other procedures. 218 Finally, in the face of doctrinal reforms that made it more difficult to certify class claims in federal
courts, plaintiffs’ attorneys moved to state courts with friendlier
judges and procedures.
It was this plaintiffs’ attorneys’ federal-to-state shift in the
1990s that provoked the anti-litigation movement to focus on
state courts.219 As the anti–class action effort continued apace, reformers began to argue that plaintiffs’ attorneys were taking advantage of friendly state procedures to flood state courts with litigation. 220 Proponents of legislation to limit state class actions
complained that many of these state cases involved federal interests, matters of interstate commerce not appropriately weighed
by state judges, and that plaintiffs were unfairly exploiting state
213 Stephen G. Burbank and Sean Farhang, Class Actions and the Counterrevolution
against Federal Litigation, 162 U Pa L Rev 1495, 1506 (2017).
214 Marcus, 48 Wm & Mary L Rev at 1287 (cited in note 82).
215 Linda S. Mullenix, Ending Class Actions As We Know Them: Rethinking the American Class Action, 64 Emory L J 399, 422 (2014).
216 See Marcus, 48 Wm & Mary L Rev at 1300–01 (cited in note 82).
217 See id at 1282–83.
218 See generally Burbank and Farhang, 165 U Pa L Rev (cited in note 213).
219 Marcus, 48 Wm & Mary L Rev at 1292–93 (cited in note 82).
220 See Mullenix, 64 Emory L J 399 at 403 (cited in note 215); Marcus, 48 Wm & Mary
L Rev at 1293 (cited in note 82). RAND found that in a single year, almost 60 percent of
reported decisions arose in state courts. Deborah R. Hensler, et al, Class Action Dilemmas:
Pursuing Public Goals for Private Gain 56 (RAND Institute for Civil Justice, 2000).

2019]

Federal Expansion

2137

courts and gaming the system.221 Notably, the criticism was infused with a contemptuous take on state courts as institutionally
inferior, underresourced, and unprepared to handle complex interstate cases.222 Advocates of a federal solution further argued
that local courts were “bias[ed]” and “prejudice[d]” against out-ofstate defendants.223 None of this went unchallenged—state governments themselves lobbied vigorously against CAFA.224 Nonetheless, the debate was shaped and decided by the presumed
harmful behavior of state courts.225
The increasing growth of securities litigation also fed the federal critique of state courts. Seeking to tamp down the filing of
“strike suits” in federal court—meritless claims in pursuit of settlement based on the drop of a company’s share price—a Republican Congress, with some Democratic support, enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 226 (PSLRA) in 1995. The
PSLRA sought to limit class action litigation by heightening
pleading standards, allowing early appeals, and limiting discovery during a pending motion to dismiss.227 But just like in the case
of large class actions more generally, plaintiffs’ attorneys moved
their claims to state court, leading to a significant increase in
state securities fraud filings.228
After decades of insistence, the anti-litigation movement’s efforts paid off with two major federalization victories: SLUSA and
CAFA. Both CAFA and SLUSA targeted state class action claims

221 John H. Beisner and Jessica Davidson Miller, They’re Making a Federal Case out
of It . . . in State Court, 25 Harv J L & Pub Pol 143, 155 (2001); Marcus, 48 Wm & Mary L
Rev at 1288 (cited in note 82).
222 Beisner and Miller, 25 Harv J L & Pub Pol at 151–52 (cited in note 221).
223 Edward A. Purcell Jr, The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective: The Old and
the New in Federal Jurisdictional Reform, 156 U Pa L Rev 1823, 1850 (2008). See also
Marcus, 48 Wm & Mary L Rev at 1292–95 (cited in note 82).
224 Marcus, 48 Wm & Mary L Rev at 1301 (cited in note 82).
225 See Interstate Class Action Jurisdiction Act of 1999 and Workplace Goods Job
Growth and Competitiveness Act of 1999, Hearings on HR 1875 and 2005 before the House
Committee on the Judiciary, 106th Cong, 1st Sess 14–15 (July 21, 1999) (letter from David
A. Brock, President of the Conference of Chief Justices) (arguing that there are no “systemic problems in state class action procedures”).
226 Pub L No 104-67, 109 Stat 737, codified as amended in various sections of Title 15.
227 David Marcus, 86 Fordham L Rev at 1838–39 (cited in note 212).
228 See Joseph A. Grundfest and Michael A. Perino, Securities Litigation Reform: The
First Year’s Experience (Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995) *6–7 (Practising
Law Institute 1997); Conference Report, HR Rep No 105-803, 105 Cong, 2d Sess 14 (1998)
(“The evidence presented in this report suggests that the level of class action securities
fraud litigation has declined by about a third in federal courts, but that there has been an
almost equal increase in the level of state-court activity.”).
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by making it easier for defendants to remove those cases to federal court. CAFA expanded federal-court jurisdiction to encompass any class actions involving more than one hundred members
and citizens of different states (so-called minimal diversity) along
with an amount in controversy of over $5 million.229 SLUSA, for
its part, preempted state class action claims in the securities
fraud context.230 A few years after its passage, the Supreme Court
interpreted the statute broadly to cover any state-law claims connected with the purchase or sale of securities.231
Among the most peculiar details of these statutes is that they
do not strike at plaintiffs’ attorneys directly. Rather, they just allow defendants to change fora—from state court to federal court.
There is an assumption in both statutes that federal courts are
more rigorous, less tolerant of plaintiffs’ firms, and friendlier to
defendants.232 Part of this is based on procedural retrenchment.
Given that federal courts are more likely to dismiss cases or reject
class certification, defendants have an incentive to move state
cases to those courts.
Taking all of these changes to their logical endpoint, four new
initiatives seem to signal further federalization. First, two years
ago Representative Steve King introduced a bill to expand diversity jurisdiction to its full constitutional limits, a change that
would upset the complete diversity balance struck by the Supreme Court in 1806.233 That bill promises to give federal jurisdiction to tens of thousands of state cases in which only one party is
diverse from one defendant. Second, in 2016, Republicans crafted
a bill to expand the fraudulent joinder doctrine so that plaintiffs
cannot avoid diversity removals to federal court by simply joining
a nondiverse party. 234 Proponents of the bill complained that
plaintiffs’ attorneys should not be able to circumvent federal
courts. Third, a few district and circuit courts have allowed homestate defendants—who must remain in state court under the diversity statute—to remove their claims to federal court before

229

CAFA § 1332(c)(5)–(6), 119 Stat at 338.
SLUSA § 16(b), 112 Stat at 3228.
231 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc v Dabit, 547 US 71, 85 (2006).
232 See Judith Resnik, Lessons in Federalism from the 1960s Class Action Rule and
the 2005 Class Action Fairness Act: “The Political Safeguards” of Aggregate Translocal
Actions, 156 U Pa L Rev 1929, 1935 (2008); Marcus, 48 Wm & Mary L Rev at 1292–95
(cited in note 82).
233 HR 3487, 115th Cong, 1st Sess (July 27, 2017).
234 See Fraudulent Joinder Prevention Act of 2016, HR 3624, 114th Cong, 2d Sess
(Feb 29, 2016).
230
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they have been served with the complaint because the diversity
statute technically covers only defendants who have already been
served.235 This is an absurd technical reading of the statute, with
results that systematically favor federal jurisdiction. Finally, after the Supreme Court’s recent decision to limit state courts’ personal jurisdiction over interstate class actions, 236 scholars now
predict a further shift of mass-torts cases from state courts to federal multidistrict litigation.237 This expectation is partly based on
evidence that MDLs have for years been “contributing toward a
shift from state to federal courts.”238 These efforts encapsulate the
third era’s rapidly evolving notion of federal power over state
claims and the further politicization of jurisdictional policy.
With regard to the empirical effects of these reforms, at least
four studies have found a significant presence of state-law
claims in federal class actions. In 2015, the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau published the first comprehensive study of arbitration and class actions in the consumer financial context.
Among other things, the study found that 57 percent of federal
complaints in its dataset involved state law, including contract
and tort supplemental claims.239 Unlike the significant presence
of state law in federal court, only 12 percent of claims filed in state
court involved federal statutory claims.240 These numbers match
a 2005 study by the Federal Judicial Center that found “59% of
attorneys filing in federal court reported a majority of state
claims.”241
In 2006, the FJC also found that CAFA had shifted a substantial number of cases from state to federal court: “[T]he
monthly average number of diversity of citizenship class actions

235

See, for example, Gibbons v Bristol-Myers Squibb, 919 F3d 699, 705 (2d Cir 2019).
See generally Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v Superior Court, 137 S Ct 1773 (2017).
237 See Andrew D. Bradt and D. Theodore Rave, Aggregation on Defendants’ Terms:
Bristol-Myers Squibb and the Federalization of Mass-Tort Litigation, 59 BC L Rev 1251,
1282 (2018) (“[I]f plaintiffs want to bring aggregate litigation outside of the defendant’s
home state after Bristol-Myers, their only practical option may be federal MDL.”).
238 Samuel Issacharoff and Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, The Hollowed Out Common
Law, 67 UCLA L Rev at *13 n 28 (forthcoming 2019).
239 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Arbitration Study at § 6, *20–21 (cited in
note 22).
240 Id at 22.
241 Willging and Wheatman, An Empirical Examination at *16 (cited in note 23).
236
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filed in or removed to the federal courts has approximately doubled in the post-CAFA period.” 242 This shift is particularly important because current federal case data only looks at the number of “cases” in federal court. Although there may be only around
fifty thousand diversity “cases” a year, to the extent that they involve CAFA jurisdiction, they likely contain hundreds of thousands or even millions of state-law claims that are aggregated
into a few cases now in federal court. This idea is supported by
yet another study of a subset of consumer cases in state and federal courts that concluded that CAFA caused a “relocation of cases
to federal courts,” that “contributed to the diminution of statebased common law.”243 The study noted that since 2000, “[c]learly,
the dominance of federal courts as forums for state-law claims, at
least in this sample, has steadily increased over time.”244 These
four studies show that state-law claims are increasingly hosted in
federal courts and support the tide of federal expansion.
In sum, in this Section, I focused on the second distinguishing
feature of the third era of judicial federalism: increasing federal
control over state class action claims. These reforms show that
after 1980, conservative forces began to push for federalization.
This story, of course, is the mirror image of the 1960s, when liberals cheered on federal courts friendlier to civil rights and criminal defendant claims. But the anti-litigation movement benefited
from support from liberals too, partly due to a deep-seated federal
struggle against growing docket loads and the mass-torts crises
of the 1980s and 1990s. This docket load fear makes sense of our
division of cases: conservative judges may not trust state courts,
but they also fear an increase in federal docket loads. Thus, the
compromise struck in the third era may have been to (a) steer
large and complex cases to federal court but (b) keep small cases
in state court. On the whole, the story is much more complicated
than a simple conservatives-versus-liberals model, but partisanship has nonetheless been a leading force in these efforts.

242 Emery G. Lee III and Thomas E. Willging, The Impact of the Class Action Fairness
Act on Federal Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Filings and Removals, 156 U Pa L Rev
1723, 1723 (2008).
243 Issacharoff and Marotta-Wurgler, 67 UCLA L Rev at *4 (cited in note 238).
244 Id at *9–10.
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3. The growth of monetarily significant cases in federal
court.
One of the consistent principles to emerge from recent federal
expansion is that monetarily significant cases belong in a federal
forum. As discussed above, the ALI’s attempt to transform the
1789 partially integrated system into one guided by Dual Judicial
Sovereignty failed.245 The 1980s procedural political economy favored instead a larger role for the federal judiciary in large cases.
The most significant reforms to diversity jurisdiction have involved enlarging the amount in controversy twice, from $10,000
in 1987 to $75,000 in 1997, and opening up federal courts to large
state class actions (through CAFA).246 Moreover, the 1960–1990s
federalization described in Part I.C.1 involved a slew of new federal statutes and the expansion of federal question jurisdiction,
removal, and supplemental jurisdiction. In enacting these statutes, Congress targeted cases that involve business or institutional litigants that operate on a national scale. The common
thread across all of these reforms is that monetarily significant
cases have gained a hook to access federal fora.
To evaluate whether the federal docket reflects a change in
the size of cases, I collected figures from the Administrative Office
about federal judicial damage awards in adjudicated cases (to the
extent there were damages awarded in summary judgment,
posttrial, etc. but not settlements) since 1980: the median, mean,
and the 75th percentile of federal awards. Below are graphical
depictions of these data points:

245
246

See notes 126–29.
See note 127 and accompanying text.
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TABLE 1: FEDERAL DAMAGE AWARDS247
Year

Median

Mean

75th
Percentile

1982
1985
1988
1991
1994
1997
2000
2003
2006
2009
2012

$8,000
$5,000
$30,000
$33,000
$52,000
$11,000
$10,000
$45,000
$58,000
$81,000
$51,000

$523,000
$1,087,000
$962,000
$1,385,000
$1,361,000
$694,000
$582,000
$1,495,000
$1,763,000
$1,519,000
$1,248,000

$67,000
$63,000
$165,000
$366,000
$250,000
$92,000
$51,000
$315,000
$673,000
$563,000
$359,000

Change
1982–2012

538%

139%

436%

The data show a considerable expansion of judicial awards.
Indeed, the growth is colossal: the median has expanded by
538 percent, the mean by 139 percent, and the upper quartile of
cases by 436 percent. The average federal case that results in a
damages award involves more than $1.2 million in 2012, up from
$523,000 in 1982. The difference between the mean and median
also shows that the distribution of awards is heavily right
skewed, meaning that there are a few awards worth billions of
dollars. The trend, however, is quite volatile, indicating that the
mass-torts explosion and other broader shifts unrelated to federalization have had a big impact. Moreover, the expansion of the
amount in controversy has certainly had some effect on the size
of cases in federal court. It is also unclear whether there has been
an increase in cases with no awards at all.248 These expansions,
however, are likely not explained solely by population, economic

247 Adjusted for inflation (in 2005 dollars). Rounded to the nearest thousand. The table ends in 2012 because of limitations in the available data.
248 We might expect this to be the case if most of the cases with judicial awards went
to trial, given that trials have largely vanished. See Nora Freeman Engstrom, The Diminished Trial, 86 Fordham L Rev 2131, 2131 (2018).
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growth, or changes to the amount in controversy, and instead signal broader shifts in the kinds of cases that reach federal courts
post–federal expansion.249
Another interesting pattern in the data is the fluctuating size
of the awards, rising slowly at times and dramatically dropping
at others. In order to visualize these changes over the past three
decades, and to observe any possible correlations with the statutory changes described above, below is a graphical representation
of the median awards in federal cases from 1980–2015:
FIGURE 3: MEDIAN AWARD IN FEDERAL CASES250
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Again, this shows a steady and at times significant growth in
awards, coupled with a considerable multi-year drop, but on the
whole, showing an inexorable rise in the third era. These changes
correlate with federal efforts to move the largest cases to federal
courts.
In order to determine whether this massive expansion was
mirrored in state courts, or occurred solely in federal courts, I
also collected data from the National Center of State Courts on
judicial damages awards. As an initial matter, 2015 data from a
representative sample of all state cases show that 75 percent of
state-court damages awards (to the extent damages were

249 See also Theodore Eisenberg, et al, Litigation Outcomes in State and Federal
Courts: A Statistical Portrait, 19 Seattle U L Rev 433, 435–37 (1996) (comparing categories
of cases in state and federal court).
250 Adjusted for inflation (in 2005 dollars). Rounded to the nearest thousand.
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awarded) were below $5,200.251 This is tiny compared to a federal
75th percentile that was closer to $359,000 in 2012. This data
point by itself shows that federal-court damage awards are orders
of magnitude higher than state courts. But the relevant question
for our purposes is about changes over time in the size of those
awards. Unfortunately, the state data is not nearly as comprehensive as that from federal courts; the only numbers available
start in 1992, end in 2005, sample only posttrial jury awards in
the largest seventy-five counties (which likely involve larger
awards on average), and are in the context of torts and contracts
claims only. Table 2 shows the time trend for those sets of cases
along with the same years in federal court and some similar data
for (bench and jury) federal torts cases:252
TABLE 2: STATE-FEDERAL DAMAGE AWARDS253
State (Jury)

1992
1996
2001
2005
Change
1992–
2005

Federal254

Contract
$77,000
$99,000
$90,000
$92,000

Torts
$71,000
$37,000
$31,000
$33,000

Cont. & Torts
$72,000
$44,000
$41,000
$43,000

Torts (Trial)
$169,000*
$161,000
$201,000*
----

19.5%

−53.5%

−40.3%

19%

(All)
$15,000
$22,000
$15,000
$60,000

300%

Although the comparison is not exactly apples to apples because of limitations in the data, at the very least we can observe
that in the state courts of the seventy-five largest counties the
median jury award in tort and contract claims (combined)

251

NCSC Report at *35 (cited in note 4).
See generally Lynn Langton and Thomas H. Cohen, Civil Bench and Jury Trials
in State Courts, 2005 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, Oct 2008), archived at
http://perma.cc/E5EN-5MAH. These figures include “Final Awards” adjusted for inflation.
The “Median Jury Awards” data covers only the seventy-five most populous counties for
purposes of standardization.
253 Adjusted for inflation, 2005 dollars.
254 Data is adjusted for inflation at constant 2005 dollars; rounded to the nearest
thousand.
252
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plunged significantly (−40.3 percent). At the same time, the median award in federal tort cases—including both bench and jury
trials—grew 19 percent in the 1994–2002 period. And the median
award in all federal cases grew by 300 percent, even if the median
was fairly stable until the 2001–2005 period. As explored above
in Table 2 and Figure 1, awards in federal courts have only expanded since 2005. This trend is likely influenced by other developments that are unrelated to federal expansion, including the
rise of tort reform efforts in state legislatures. Regardless, the
available evidence seems to show that federal courts are increasingly hosting the largest claims in the third era (and state courts
are not).
4. The perceived decay of state courts since 1980.
Developments in the third era of judicial federalism have
been influenced by scholarly and litigant perceptions that state
courts are mired in decay. While there is no doubt that state
courts have improved significantly on many measures and are
likely better than ever,255 the critique—which I call the state decline thesis—is that they have decayed relative to federal courts.
Although it is difficult to capture with precision the concept of
judicial decay, several strands of evidence support the idea that
state courts are not as well funded as federal courts, lack vibrancy, and are no longer the leading developers of the common
law. In an attempt to flesh out the state decline thesis, this Section focuses on scholarly discussions of states courts’ role in legal
developments, litigant views of state courts, and funding levels
for state judiciaries.
The modern scholarly view of state-court decay began in the
late 1960s and coalesced into a full-blown critique in the 1970s
and 1980s. Fresh from federal judicial victories in the civil rights
movement, legal scholars observed that southern state courts
were on the wrong side of history as leading opponents of school
desegregation, making lower federal courts the only “redeemers”
of the American constitutional order.256 Observing these developments, Professor Burt Neuborne argued in 1977 that federal

255

See note 450 and accompanying text.
See David W. Romero and Francine Sanders Romero, Precedent, Parity, and Racial Discrimination: A Federal/State Comparison of the Impact of Brown v. Board of Education, 37 L & Soc Rev 809, 818–20 (2003) (finding that there was only a dramatic change
after Brown in federal courts, but not state courts, particularly those in the South).
256
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courts had superior “technical competence” than state courts because of higher caliber judges and a better institutional setting.257
For that reason, Neuborne argued, state courts were likely less
receptive to constitutional rights.258 This piece unleashed a broad
debate about federal-state parity that centered mostly on the
question of state-court openness to constitutional rights rather
than just a broader disparity in “quality.”259 Nonetheless, many
scholars agreed that state courts had lost their edge, arguing that
“the ‘action’ in American law” had shifted from the states to “the
national level” partly because state judges were no longer improving the common law.260 Some argued that state courts had “faded
in significance” as innovators.261
A set of empirically minded scholars carried on the state decline thesis in the 2000s, centering on the corrosive effect of judicial elections and political corruption. Professors Michael Kang
and Joanna Shepherd, for example, have argued that there is a
correlation between electoral donations in state supreme court
races—which are higher than they have ever been—and certain
state-court decisions. 262 These and other studies supported the
idea that since at least the 1980s, state-court elections have become more competitive and decisions may be increasingly influenced by donors, worsening the quality of state courts relative to
the appointed federal judiciary.263
Beyond scholarly perceptions, attorney surveys in the third
era find that litigants consider federal courts to be more competent than state courts. Studies in the early 1980s exploring attorney court preferences between federal and state courts had mixed
findings on the relevance of judicial competence to forum choice.264
257

Neuborn, 90 Harv L Rev at 1120–21 (cited in note 11).
See id at 1123.
259 See, for example, Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the
Federal Judiciary, 36 UCLA L Rev 233, 244 (1988).
260 See, for example, Goldberg, 34 Touro L Rev at 153 (cited in note 11).
261 See, for example, id at 153. See also, for example, Issacharoff and MarottaWurgler, 67 UCLA L Rev at *13–15 (cited in note 238).
262 Michael S. Kang and Joanna M. Shepherd, Partisanship in State Supreme Courts:
The Empirical Relationship between Party Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decision
Making, 44 J Legal Stud 161, 178–80 (2015).
263 See id at 180–81. To be clear, federal courts have gone through their own crises
over the past few decades. For example, Congress has not increased the number of federal
judges since 1990 and immigration dockets have exploded, leading to significant delays.
264 Compare Jolanta Juszkiewicz Perlstein, Lawyers’ Strategies and Diversity Jurisdiction, 3 L & Pol Q 321, 332 (1981) (finding that judicial competence did not significantly
impact forum choice), with Kristin Bumiller, Choice of Forum in Diversity Cases: Analysis
of a Survey and Implications for Reform, 15 L & Soc Rev 749, 768 (1980) (“Preference for
258

2019]

Federal Expansion

2147

By contrast, beginning in the early 1990s, a series of studies polling attorney preferences between state and federal courts reported that “federal judges are perceived as superior to statecourt judges. Virtually all of the defense attorneys and a large
proportion of the plaintiff attorneys said that federal judges are
more competent.”265 Attorneys report that “the federal courts provide superior justice to that provided by state courts.”266 Although
subject to selection bias, the studies show a consistent belief that
federal courts are more competent.
Scholarly and attorney perceptions of state-court decay have
been bolstered by American Bar Association (ABA) and judicial
reports that have continuously decried the dramatic underfunding of state courts. Since the early 1990s, the ABA, the National
Center for State Courts, and other legal organizations have
warned of impending “disaster” due to overburdened and underfunded state judiciaries.267 After the 1992–1993 recession, state
courts “struggled with layoffs, hiring freezes and cutbacks in services,” court staff faced “furloughs,” and some court systems were
“financially bankrupt.”268 In the early 2000s, the ABA complained
that “States have variously been forced to halt civil trials, suspend jury trials, eliminate drug treatment courts, condense jurisdictions, force unpaid furloughs on court employees, leave judicial
positions unfilled, suspend pay for counsel for the indigent, close
courthouses and cut staff, in some cases dramatically.”269 After
the 2008 financial crisis, a RAND Corporation study found
mounting evidence that many state courts have been struggling with increased case-load demands, decreased staffing
levels, and frozen to slashed annual operating budgets. Chief
justices from across the nation have decried the funding cuts
that state court systems have suffered, asserting that courts
the perceived higher quality judges in the federal courts is a consistently important factor.”); Jerry Goldman and Kenneth S. Marks, Diversity Jurisdiction and Local Bias: A
Preliminary Empirical Inquiry, 9 J Legal Stud 93, 97–98 (1980) (finding that 92 percent
of attorneys representing out-of-state clients cite the perception that federal judges are
superior to state judges as relevant to choosing a federal forum).
265 Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of Forum Choices in Removal Cases under Diversity and Federal Question Jurisdiction, 41 Am U L Rev 369, 433 (1992).
266 Id at 379.
267 Don J. DeBenedictis, Struggling toward Recovery: Courts Hope That BeltTightening Lessons from the Recession Will Help Them Make It through the ‘90s, 80 ABA
J 50, 50 (1994).
268 Id at 50–51.
269 Frances Kahn Zemans, Court Funding *11 (ABA, Aug 2003), archived at
http://perma.cc/249Y-R64R (ABA Report 2003).
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are “at the tipping point of dysfunction,” “on the edge of an
abyss,” and “slowly failing.”270
All of these studies paint a bleak picture of state-court funding.271
To make matters worse, federal courts continue to routinely
poach state judges.272 This judicial lateraling has been dramatically asymmetrical: over nine hundred state judges have moved
to federal courts while only fourteen have gone the other way.273
Out of all of these theories and statements about state-court
decline, the best area to look for empirical evidence may indeed
be in judicial funding data. State judicial funding can be a good
proxy for judicial independence, vitality of the court system, access to court, and relative decline over time compared to federal
courts. As the ABA has explained, “There is significant potential
for court funding to affect judicial independence in a variety of
ways.”274 Differences in funding levels over time can be illuminating because they impact judicial delays, docket loads, and even
whether courts keep their doors open. Because judicial funding
comes mostly from general funds appropriated by state legislatures,275 funding levels can also indicate state governments’ relative commitment to their judiciaries. The health of judicial budgets also emphasize that judges have to lobby state legislatures
and governors on a routine basis, placing them at the center of
their states’ judicial political economy.276
In order to compare state to federal judicial funding over the
last four decades—and to evaluate the viability of the state
decline thesis—I assembled data from the Bureau of Justice
Statistics (the “Bureau”) on funding for judicial and legal services. 277 The Bureau relies on “annual surveys of government
270 McGovern and Greenberg, Who Pays for Justice? at *1 (cited in note 8). But see
Michael D. Greenberg and Geoffrey McGovern, An Early Assessment of the Civil Justice
System After the Financial Crisis: Something Wicked This Way Comes? *14 (RAND Corporation, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/2F2Q-DZKC (noting that budget numbers did
not match perceived panic, but “state courts may face growing challenges”).
271 See also Judith Resnik, Courts and Economic and Social Rights/Courts as Economic and Social Rights, in Katharine G. Young, ed, The Future of Economic and Social
Rights (Cambridge 2018).
272 Jonathan Remy Nash, Judicial Laterals, 70 Vand L Rev 1911, 1927 (2017).
273 Id.
274 ABA Report 2003 at *2 (cited in note 269).
275 Id at 13.
276 Id at 17.
277 See generally Data User’s Guide to the Justice Expenditure and Employment Data
Series (Bureau of Justice Statistics), archived at http://perma.cc/KS2F-46F5. Data available at http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbse&sid=33 (visited Sept 30, 2019) (Perma archive unavailable).
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finances and employment,” compiled by the US Census Bureau.278
In 2015, the latest year with complete data, state governments
spent nearly $23 billion in their judicial systems, local governments contributed about $22.5 billion, and the federal government spent roughly $15.7 billion. But on the question of relative
decay over time, there does seem to be some support for the decline thesis. Below is a table summarizing federal and state expenditures increases on judicial and legal services from 1982–
2015 (excluding the sizable local expenditures except on the per
case category):
TABLE 3: STATE AND FEDERAL JUDICIAL LEGAL EXPENDITURES
(REAL DOLLARS)
Year

1982
1992
2002
2015

Absolute
(Millions)
Federal
$2,978
$7,030
$10,997
$15,685

State
$6,189
$10,891
$18,526
$22,982

Compound
Growth
Federal
--136%
269%
427%

State
--75%
199%
271%

Per Case279
Federal
$4,908
$5,596
$5,822
$13,066

State & Local
$624
$794
$1,040
$1144

As Table 3 displays, federal judicial expenditures have expanded significantly in the third era, showing a remarkable
427 percent growth in the 1982–2015 period. This is even more
noteworthy once we adjust it on a per judge or case basis. Although the states’ spending on their courts and legal services has
also grown considerably, state courts continuously lag behind federal courts, opening up a substantial funding gap. Indeed, as Figure 4 indicates, even in absolute terms, federal courts are catching up to state expenditures—though the gap is much larger
when local expenditures are included—despite their substantially smaller caseloads:

278
279

courts.

Data User’s Guide at *2 (cited in note 277).
Includes bankruptcy cases in federal courts and excludes traffic cases in state
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FIGURE 4: ABSOLUTE EXPENDITURES ON JUDICIAL SERVICES
(IN MILLIONS)280
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It is unclear whether this relative funding decay over time
translates into the broader competence gap that Neuborne highlighted.281 On the one hand, as the ABA and others have argued,
court funding may be the key variable in predicting the functioning of a judicial system, correlating with access to court, court delays, and staff hiring. On the other hand, the states have improved in absolute terms and do not seem to lag the federal courts
on salary growth or other variables.
Why is this happening? There are likely many contributing
factors at play, including state balanced budget requirements, the
weakening of public sector unions, generalized austerity, and, as
I discuss in Part II.B.1, federal expansion’s effect on the political
economy of state courts. At the end of the day, it may be impossible to settle the question empirically—but scholarly, litigant, and
ABA perceptions of relative state-court decay seem to find some
support in important variables and suggest that state deterioration is at least politically at the center of the third era. Federal
policymakers have used the alleged deterioration of state courts

280
281

Note: This excludes local expenditures, which can be quite significant.
See note 257 and accompanying text.
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to justify further federal expansion. That seems to be a unique
development of the third era.
5. The rise of arbitration and alternative fora.
The last axe to fall on state courts comes not from federal
courts directly, but from the rise of private arbitration, administrative adjudication, and New York and Delaware commercial
courts. With regards to arbitration, an extensive literature has
documented how in a series of cases beginning in the early 1980s,
federal courts revived the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 282
(FAA)—using it to compel arbitration wherever possible. 283 For
example, Professor Maria Glover has noted that as a result of this
three-decade long process, “cases that would otherwise proceed in
the public realm—the courts—have been moved to a purely private realm, which is largely shielded from judicial and public
scrutiny.” 284 Supreme Court pro-arbitration decisions coincided
with the beginning of the third era, going from a relatively subdued decision calling the FAA “a liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration agreements”285 in 1983 to a set of aggressive decisions
in the 1990s and 2000s on arbitration of securities law, consumer,
antitrust, and employment claims.286 The effect of these decisions
on state law has been widely studied, including, as I discuss below, the potential danger that private arbitration precludes the
development of state common law.287 Similarly, there has been a
concomitant growth in agency adjudication of millions of claims
and a shift in commercial cases from other states to New York
and Delaware.288 It is hard to overstate the potentially disruptive

282

43 Stat 883, codified as amended at 9 USC § 1 et seq.
See J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law,
124 Yale L J 3052, 3062 (2015); Judith Resnik, The Privatization of Process: Requiem for
and Celebration of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure at 75, 162 U Pa L Rev 1793, 1812–
14 (2014).
284 Glover, 124 Yale L J at 3054 (cited in note 283). See also generally Myriam Gilles,
The Day Doctrine Died: Private Arbitration and the End of Law, 2016 Ill L Rev 371.
285 Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v Mercury Construction Corp, 460 US 1,
24 (1983).
286 See Glover, 124 Yale L J at 3061 (cited in note 283); Mitsubishi Motors Corporation
v Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc, 473 US 614, 625 (1985); Shearson/American Express Inc
v McMahon, 482 US 220, 226 (1987).
287 See notes 407–08.
288 Michael Sant’Ambrogio and Adam S. Zimmerman, Inside the Agency Class Action,
126 Yale L J 1634, 1652–53 (2017); John F. Coyle, Business Courts and Interstate Competition, 53 Wm & Mary L Rev 1915, 1922–23, 1951–52 (2012).
283
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effect of these trends on state courts. These changes allow litigants to opt out of state court into alternate tribunals.
***
In this Section, I outlined the third era of judicial federalism,
defined by three core changes: federal expansion over state-law
claims, the massive growth of monetarily significant cases in federal court, and the relative decay of state courts. The changes involved both statutory enactments and doctrinal innovations at
the Supreme Court. The combination of many federal changes
seemed poised to shift a vast swath of cases from state to federal
court. Although the data is limited, there are empirical trends
that are consistent with the doctrinal changes (even if they do not
demonstrate a causal relationship): (1) an increasing concentration of federal claims in federal court; (2) an increasing concentration of state claims in federal court; (3) the expansion of the
damages means/medians in federal court; and (4) a growing
budget gap between the two systems. All of this shows that there
has been a veritable explosion in the size of federal cases.
As a concluding note to this historical periodization, it is important to recognize that all three eras of judicial federalism were
defined by historical events and the efforts of political parties to
retain a political majority. The first by founding era disputes between federalists and Anti-Federalists, state-court predominance, and antipathy toward federal judicial power; the second by
the Civil War, progressivism, prohibition, and the mid-twentiethcentury docket load crisis. And the third by the Reagan presidency, class actions, and corporate backlash against the litigation
state. Beginning from a founding-era partial integration of the
two court systems, the country moved away from integration after
the Civil War and toward a more bifurcated understanding of the
two judiciaries. Both diversity and federal question jurisdiction
became entangled in larger questions about Reconstruction, the
growth of railroads, and progressivism. And the trend was not
necessarily toward more federal power; in opposing diversity, progressives wanted to empower state courts. It was only in the
midst of the Second Era, between 1920 and 1980, that judges and
reformers invented the idea of federal sensitivity to state judicial
power.289 And in the third era, the federal government reversed
its views and began to monopolize state-court cases.
289

McManamon, 27 Ga L Rev 697 at 700 (cited at note 74).
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II. THE COSTS OF FEDERAL EXPANSION IN THE THIRD ERA
Scholars have for the most part welcomed federal expansion
as beneficial for overburdened state courts and the requirements
of a national economy.290 Taking a contrary approach, this Part
highlights several drawbacks to federal expansion and its possible connection to the decay of state courts, including: (1) a growing divergence between state and federal courts with regards to
proplaintiff and prodefendant procedural rules; (2) the potential
hollowing out of institutional litigant stakeholders at the statecourt level; and (3) the states’ diminishing ability to shape the
common law.
Before proceeding, two clarifications on my terminology and
analysis are appropriate. First, in this Part, I repeatedly refer to
“large institutional defendants,” “business litigants,” “prodefendant” rules, or “corporate defendants.” When I use those terms I
am referring, roughly speaking, to the two thousand or so largest
firms by market capitalization. 291 Studies have suggested that
these firms are “mega litigants” responsible for most legal expenditures in federal and state court and that their preferences
differ from smaller firms.292 These firms, however, can be plaintiffs too, especially in business-to-business litigation. Nonetheless, they are mostly on the defense side, so I refer to them as
defendants. Similarly, when I use the terms “plaintiffs’” or “proplaintiff” rules, I am generally referring to plaintiffs’ firms, who
are systematically on the plaintiff side in most cases.
Second, although I address the states as a homogeneous
group, there may be relevant state-by-state differences. I address
some of these potential differences when relevant below. My focus, however, is on the structural relationship between state and
federal courts, which should in theory be uniform. Nonetheless, I
acknowledge that this carveout may affect some of the analysis
below.

290 See Issacharoff and Sharkey, 53 UCLA L Rev at 1368 (cited in note 10). But see,
for example, Schwarzer and Wheeler, 23 Stetson L Rev at 682 (cited in note 30) (arguing
that increasing caseloads undermine federal courts).
291 See Terence Dunworth and Joel Rogers, Corporations in Court: Big Business Litigation in U.S. Federal Courts, 1971–1991, 21 Law & Soc Inquiry 497, 518–20 (1996).
292 See Gillian K. Hadfield, Exploring Economic and Democratic Theories of Civil Litigation: Differences between Individual and Organizational Litigants in the Disposition of
Federal Civil Cases, 57 Stan L Rev 1275, 1285 (2005); Joanna Schwartz, The Cost of Suing
Business, 65 DePaul L Rev 655, 676–77 (2016). By “plaintiffs” I similarly mean the plaintiffs’ attorneys bar.
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Plaintiff-Defendant Divergence between State and Federal
Courts and Distributional Consequences

In this Section, I analyze how the third era of judicial federalism has theoretically shaped the stakeholder pools in state
courts. I argue that federal expansion has allowed business defendants to opt out of state courts into arbitration or federal court
and, by consequence, turned state judiciaries more plaintiff
friendly relative to federal courts. I then examine empirical evidence supporting that prediction in procedural law, including:
(1) plaintiff win rates in federal court have collapsed from 70 percent to 35 percent between 1985 and 2000 but not in state courts;
(2) attorneys report in surveys that state courts are friendlier to
plaintiffs and federal courts less hostile to defendants; (3) civil
procedure studies conclude that state courts have resisted a
prodefendant trend of federal changes; and (4) state civil rules’
advisory committees have greater representation of plaintiffs’
interests than the federal advisory committee. Finally, I
examine normative concerns with such an outcome, including the
possibility of a negative downward spiral that leads to cyclical
federalization.
1. Plaintiffs and defendants in state and federal courts.
One clear effect of federal expansion is that large institutional litigants can increasingly litigate in federal court or arbitration as opposed to state court. This development is fueled by
evolving plaintiff and defendant strategies. On the one hand, federal expansion means that plaintiffs’ attorneys have a newfound
variety of federal claims that did not exist pre-1960. Whether it is
statutes on products liability, civil rights, securities, airlinecarrier liability, or labor-management relations, among others,
plaintiffs’ attorneys can increasingly include federal claims in
their litigation toolbox. And to the extent that these attorneys
pursue comprehensive remedies, they should prefer to file add-on
federal claims in any court of their choice (state or federal).293 On
the other hand, these dynamics can influence defendants’ choices,
too. If plaintiffs file more federal claims, then defendants will increasingly litigate in federal court both as an initial matter and
because they can easily remove those claims. And we know that
business defendants do prefer federal courts to state courts (as I

293

See Part II.A.3.
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discuss below).294 In consequence, business litigants can more easily opt out of state courts.
The ability of business defendants to move to federal court
and arbitration should not come as a surprise. As explored in
Part I.C, businesses were largely responsible for the expansion of
diversity jurisdiction, CAFA, and other federal statutes precisely
because they preferred to litigate in the more conservative federal
judiciary. And businesses were partly successful in doing this:
some studies have found that business litigants are involved in a
significant majority of federal civil cases. For example, Professor
Gillian Hadfield has calculated (under several assumptions) that
from 1970 to 2000, “[o]rganizational defendants have gone from
being named in approximately 68% of cases . . . to 83%.”295 Businesses are now seemingly reaping the benefits of federal expansion that they desperately sought.
The likely emigration of business defendants from state to
federal courts can have noticeable effects on the stakeholder pool
at the state level. Each court system is composed of a dynamic set
of stakeholders: insurance companies, plaintiffs’ attorneys, small
plaintiffs, business defendants, government defendants, and
other run-of-the-mill litigants. In theory, it is easy to see how this
pool can be thrown out of balance by federal intervention. For example, the typical environmental nonprofit organization in the
early 1960s likely litigated mostly state tort or nuisance claims
against industrial polluters in state court. But a flurry of federal
environmental statutes in the early 1970s shifted the locus of litigation to federal law and federal court.296 This should have, in
theory, shifted the presence of environmental nonprofit stakeholders from state court to federal court. Similarly, if Congress
abrogates the states’ sovereign immunity for a particular set of
federal claims, then we should expect state governments to become greater stakeholders in federal court.297 By the same logic,
the increasing ease of removal in the third era should shift a
slice of business litigants from the state stakeholder pool to the
federal one.
There are several reasons, however, to believe that emigration from state to federal court should not be symmetrical between corporate defendants and plaintiffs’ attorneys—we should
294
295
296
297

See note 433 and accompanying text.
Hadfield, 57 Stan L Rev at 1304 (cited in note 292).
See Issacharoff and Sharkey, 53 UCLA L Rev at 1380–82 (cited in note 10).
See, for example, Fitzpatrick v Bitzer, 427 US 445, 451–52 (1976).
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expect corporate defendants to increasingly opt out of state court
and move to federal court while plaintiffs’ attorneys stay behind:
First, a significant percentage of corporate litigation is business to business.298 And these may be precisely the kinds of cases
most likely to move to federal court or arbitration—because of
their size, claims, sophisticated attorneys, and interstate diversity—leaving behind a corporate-bereft state stakeholder pool.
For example, one area of increased business-to-business litigation
in federal court is trade secrets lawsuits, in which institutional
players now have a federal statute at their disposal.299 Similarly,
available data from arbitration organizations show double-digit
growth in commercial business-to-business cases. 300 As those
cases leave state court, they remove businesses as stakeholders.
But this business emigration does not affect the number of cases
involving plaintiffs’ side interests—plaintiffs’ attorneys—in state
court. That is because plaintiffs’ attorneys almost never sue each
other. This fundamental asymmetry, in which businesses do sue
each other but plaintiffs’ attorneys do not, by itself explains why
state courts may be increasingly influenced by plaintiffs’ attorneys, who may become a bigger part of their stakeholder pool relative to corporate defendants. Although those plaintiffs’ firms are
still suing someone—often corporations—those remaining defendants may both lack the political support they used to have
from now-departed institutional litigants and may themselves
face different kinds of claims.
Second, in the face of caseload migration to federal court,
state judges increasingly interested in retaining certain cases
may compete for plaintiffs’ firms’ attention because those firms
make the initial decision of where to file a case.301 While state
judges may be happy to offload large segments of their dockets
and ease their workload, any realistic conception of judges as individuals predicts that they are also interested in retaining cases
that increase their own reputation and prestige.302 Of course, in a
two-sided litigation market in which defendants decide whether
298 Donald J. Farole Jr, Contract Bench and Jury Trials in State Courts, 2005 *3 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sept 2009), archived at http://perma.cc/QY75-T737. See also
Schwartz, 65 DePaul L Rev at 666–67 (cited in note 292); Hadfield, 57 Stan L Rev at 1288–
89 (cited in note 292).
299 Rachel Bailey, Trade Secret Litigation Report 2018 *2–4 (Lex Machina, July 2018).
300 Arbitration Remains a Trusted Venue for Resolving B2B Disputes (American Arbitration Association, Feb 27, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/L7CV-JGQC.
301 Zambrano, 70 Stan L Rev 1805 at 1844–45 (cited in note 9).
302 See notes 314–15.
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to remove a case or to remain in state court, judges also have some
incentive to compete for corporate defendants’ attention. But
plaintiffs have the unique power to structure a case to avoid removal. And besides, state judges cannot truly compete with
prodefendant federal rules given that state courts have, in a
sense, already lost the defense side of the market. If judges are
competing for plaintiffs’ attention, as I discuss below, then we
should expect plaintiffs’ firms to prefer state court.
Third, plaintiffs have more opportunities to find friendly
judges among the heterogeneous state courts. With fifty separate
court systems and no centralized appellate authority over state
law, state courts are more numerous and ideologically diverse.
Some state judiciaries are more conservative, others more liberal.
By contrast, federal courts are fewer, are appointed by the same
government, and are controlled by the Supreme Court. This likely
makes federal courts less ideologically diverse, and perhaps more
stable and centrist. Because plaintiffs choose their forum, subject
to personal jurisdiction limits, they can select the state judges
that are on the proplaintiff tail of the distribution. So even if the
median state court is similar to the median federal court with respect to plaintiff friendliness, the state courts in which plaintiffs
file will be significantly more plaintiff friendly than corresponding federal courts.
Finally, on the defense side, it is the largest and most influential firms with multistate operations that are increasingly able
to remove claims to federal court. Small businesses may instead
remain in state court as influential repeat players in small routine cases, like debt collection or landlord-tenant claims. 303 By
contrast, on the plaintiffs’ side, emigration to federal court should
be a mixed affair. On the one hand, many of the largest plaintiffs’
firms may happily federalize their claims. This is especially true
for firms that specialize in federal class actions or MDL litigation.
On the other hand, sophisticated plaintiffs’ firms may also strategically keep their litigation in state courts for the reasons discussed above.304 So there is no clear-cut reason to predict that the
largest plaintiffs’ firms will, on average, federalize their claims.
These dynamics mean that, even assuming a modest decline
of business-to-business litigation, we should expect a state stakeholder pool that is bereft of the largest business defendants and
303 Judith Resnik, Revising Our “Common Intellectual Heritage”: Federal and State
Courts in Our Federal System, 91 Notre Dame L Rev 1831, 1929 (2016).
304 See Miller, 41 Am U L Rev at 381 (cited in note 265).
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may become dominated by other groups, including plaintiffs’
firms. Once business litigants begin to opt out of state court and,
thereafter, plaintiff-side interests make up a larger share of the
litigant pool, we may expect state judiciaries to resist federal
courts’ prodefendant reforms. This prediction depends on two
premises:
The first one is that as business litigants opt out, they are no
longer repeat players interested in shaping state law. As Professor Marc Galanter has argued, litigation repeat players play for
the long haul and seek to shape the structure of substantive and
procedural law. 305 These players strategically settle or litigate
claims to mold the law in their favor in the long run. The larger
the player, the more resources they have to engage in long-term
legal system design through strategic litigation. But the removal
of repeat defendant businesses from state courts—especially the
largest litigants—means that they should no longer be as interested in playing the litigation game (at least with the same vigor)
in state court. Without a strong long-term interest, there is less
of an incentive for business defendants to invest in state-court legal strategies and may instead shift their litigation game to federal courts.
Plaintiff-side firms may then begin to control state litigation
in unexpected ways. For example, large defendant law firms may
de-emphasize their state-court practices, contribute less to local
bar associations, or simply ignore local state politics. Business
lobbyists may change their interaction patterns, too. The extent
to which plaintiff-side interests would pick up the slack or departing business defendants may drag plaintiffs’ firms along to federal courts is unclear. But as public choice theory predicts, a small
but deeply committed and increasingly unopposed group of plaintiffs’ lawyers—who prefer state court, do not place as much emphasis on competence, and who have a mix of state and federal
cases—could become dominant at the state level.306
Either way, even if plaintiffs’ firms do not come to exercise
more influence over state courts, at the very least the remaining
stakeholder pool would be less corporate heavy than before. By
sheer default, the entire pool may be more plaintiff friendly. The
point is that as large businesses care less about state litigation,
they may cede some of their influence to other stakeholders who
305

Galanter, 2001 Wis L Rev at 619 n 127 (cited in note 191).
See Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of
Groups 23–36 (Harvard 1971) (outlining small group effects).
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are invested in local litigation. We should at minimum expect
businesses to be more interested in shaping federal, and not state,
law and procedure.
There is suggestive evidence in amicus brief filings that
supports this theory. 307 The Chamber of Commerce, and other
defense-side lawyers associations, have significantly increased
their amicus filings in federal class actions cases “by a factor of
thirty-five” in the third era (between the 1980s and 2000s).308 This
thirty-five-fold growth significantly outstrips the general growth
of amicus filings in that time (which went up by a factor of
“3.3”),309 and the Chamber of Commerce specifically is now the
largest single filer by far.310 Studies of state-court amicus filings
have also found an increase in business filings, but, in contrast to
federal courts, business’s share of state amicus filings declined
from a dominant 42.9 percent in 1965 to 23.3 percent in 1990.311
At the same time, and in line with the rising state court influence
of plaintiffs-side interests, “organizations representing lawyers
. . . and other ‘legal’ interests” began to file amicus briefs “in increasing numbers” in that period.312
A second important premise here is that courts as institutions, and judges as employees, are influenced by their stakeholders because they are participants in a litigation market. As Professor William Landes and Judge Richard Posner have previously
outlined, courts can be analyzed as suppliers in a litigation market shaped by the demands of litigants.313 Within this market for
litigation, judges can be seen as laborers who seek to maximize
their popularity, prestige, and reputation, among other values in

307 See Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell Jr to Eugene Sydnor Jr, Chairman of the
Education Committee, US Chamber of Commerce, Attack on American Free Enterprise
System *27 (Aug 23, 1971), archived at http://perma.cc/DP42-TSP5 (encouraging the
Chamber of Commerce to aggressively use amicus briefs to promote a probusiness
agenda).
308 Burbank and Farhang, 165 U Pa L Rev at 1525 (cited in note 213).
309 Id at 1526–28.
310 See Adam Chandler, Cert.-Stage Amicus “All Stars”: Where Are They Now? (SCOTUSblog, Apr 4, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/5L42-GBV9. See also David L.
Franklin, What Kind of Business-Friendly Court—Explaining the Chamber of Commerce’s
Success at the Roberts Court, 49 Santa Clara L Rev 1019, 1023–24 (2009).
311 Lee Epstein, Exploring the Participation of Organized Interests in State Court Litigation, 47 Pol Rsrch Q 335, 347 (1994).
312 Id at 346.
313 See, for example, William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a
Private Good, 8 J Legal Stud 235, 236–40, 238–39 (1979). See also Zambrano, 70 Stan L
Rev at 1844 n 191 (cited in note 9) (collecting sources).
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their utility function. 314 This is especially true for state judges
who are subject to elections in a majority of states.315 Not only
does economic theory and political science predict this, social psychology theory also compellingly predicts that state judges should
care deeply about the preferences of legal and social elites.316
Beyond their role as supply-side employees, judges are also
embedded in a network of lawyers.317 They are not only lawyers
themselves, but are also prominent members of their legal communities, speakers at bar association gatherings, and deeply enmeshed in the legal field. So too for state legislators who are
equally influenced by the local bar.318 As such, courts, legislators,
and judges are likely to respond to the interests of their local legal
elites through a set of dynamics that may be thought of as “cultural capture.”319 This kind of influence can manifest in conferences where judges and practitioners interact, amicus briefs, and
law school events. As Judge Diane Wood once noted, “[D]ispute
resolution is, at its base, a service, and it should not be surprising
that states will take steps to provide needed services to their important political constituents.”320
To the extent that the local legal community or litigation
stakeholder pool is gradually bereft of business litigants, we may
expect state judiciaries to drift toward the preferences of the remaining stakeholders, which may tend to be dominated by plaintiffs’ firms still interested in local litigation. 321 By contrast, we
314

See Landes and Posner, 8 J Legal Stud at 238–39 (cited in note 313).
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316 See Neal Devins and Nicole Mansker, Public Opinion and State Supreme Courts,
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317 See Gerhard Wagner, The Dispute Resolution Market, 62 Buff L Rev 1085,
1129 (2014).
318 See id at 1130–32.
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Capture and the Financial Crisis, in Daniel Carpenter and David A. Moss, eds, Preventing
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of State Courts (Free Press 1988).
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Anderson, Court Capture, 59 BC L Rev 1543, 1551 (2018); Brett McDonnell and Daniel
Schwarcz, Regulatory Contrarians, 89 NC L Rev 1629 (2011).
315

2019]

Federal Expansion

2161

may expect federal courts to be increasingly influenced by institutional defendants.
A state-court proplaintiff drift does not have to be conscious.
I already outlined one mechanical route for change: large businesses would no longer bring cases or settle claims with the goal
of shaping the long-term development of state law. Moreover,
when defendants do end up in state court it may occur because
plaintiffs’ attorneys designed the case to keep it there. So there
would be a selection effect—remaining state cases would be plaintiff friendly. Another avenue of change may be based on subconscious psychological effects. Flattered state judges may side with
the lawyers who favor their own state courts and come to dislike
the large litigants who constantly remove claims to federal
court. 322 They may then rule differently in a litigation field no
longer dominated by large institutional defendants.
Of course, a plaintiff or defendant divergence probably does
not apply to every state court equally. State courts that enjoy robust business support and lobbying—like the New York commercial division and Delaware’s Chancery Court—are likely incentivized by their business constituency to avoid proplaintiff reforms.
Larger states may enjoy a more diverse business and litigant community while smaller states may be influenced by either small
businesses or a single large business.323 Moreover, plaintiffs’ attorneys do not have to forum shop in every state—they are more
likely to find outlier state courts that can be much more proplaintiff compared to the average federal court. All of this would affect
the dynamics discussed above.
2. Evidence of divergence in procedural law.
All of these effects—on stakeholder pools, state and federal
law, and courts—should be most evident not in substantive law
but in state and federal procedural law. Even if large institutional
defendants opt out of state court, they will continue to have an
incentive to shape state substantive law because under Erie that

322 After all, this was part of the motivating concern for why Congress passed CAFA
and SLUSA in the first place. See notes 229–32 and accompanying text.
323 See John B. Oakley and Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A
Survey of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 Wash L Rev 1367, 1426 (1986) (noting
that “less populous states” have more “systematically modeled their civil procedures on
the Federal Rules” than “[s]tates with larger populations”).
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law is applied in federal court.324 In other words, large institutional defendants may be able to opt out of state courts, but they
cannot fully opt out of state substantive law. Therefore, the right
legal locus to observe the effects of the third era is in procedural
law because that law can and does differ in state and federal
courts. It is in state civil procedure that businesses may no longer
have as much at stake in the repeat player game.
Setting aside theory, some empirical evidence does support
these expected trends; state and federal courts are veering away
from each other in predictable ways. A recent study shows that
between 1985 and the late 1990s, plaintiff win rates in adjudicated federal-court cases dropped from 70 percent to 30 percent
before stabilizing.325 There is no evidence of a similar decline in
state courts nor a clear explanation for this dramatic drop.326 This
is an astonishing fall that matches other developments in the
third era. Early studies of attorney preferences in diversity jurisdiction cases—written in the late 1970s and 1980s—described
mixed findings on the question of different court preferences between plaintiffs’ and defendants’ counsel.327 One research survey
supported by the National Center for State Courts in 1988 found
that “[t]he predilection to favor state courts or federal courts did
not differ by type of counsel.”328 Indeed, the defense bar even opposed an effort to federalize class actions in the 1980s.329 Since the
early 1990s, however, a series of studies exploring attorney preferences has consistently found that plaintiffs’ attorneys prefer to
litigate in state court and institutional defendants in federal
court.330 Already in 1992, Neal Miller of the Institute for Law and
Justice found that in a large sample of removal cases (which suffer from selection problems)331: “Plaintiff attorneys reported that
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favorable bias . . . with respect to their clients in state court is
relatively common” and “[d]efense attorneys’ forum preference for
federal court is based on expectations of lesser hostility there toward business litigants.”332
Several other studies have reached similar conclusions about
this state proplaintiff and federal prodefendant divergence. In
1995, one study found that “[a]ttorneys who regard corporate status as an important consideration in forum selection favor federal
courts if their client is a corporation and state courts if their opponent is a corporation.” 333 Most importantly, a 2005 research
project shepherded by the Federal Judicial Center found that
class-action plaintiffs’ attorneys preferred to litigate in state
court because they perceived them—and state substantive and
procedural law—as friendlier to their interests.334 Defendants, by
contrast, preferred federal court for similar reasons.335 These findings, of course, support the beliefs of congressional supporters of
CAFA.336 To be sure, not all of the data point in the same direction. Some researchers have found that a surprising number of
in-state plaintiffs bring cases in federal court.337 But the general
thrust of existing empirical studies supports the idea that plaintiffs’ attorneys prefer state court and businesses federal court.
Not only do attorneys’ preferences differ, the development of
procedural law shows a state proplaintiff inclination relative to
federal courts. As discussed above, in the past thirty years, the
federal courts have engaged in procedural retrenchment—a systematic effort to close access to federal court through reform to
pleading, personal jurisdiction, class actions, arbitration, and discovery, among other procedures.338 These efforts have been part
of a broader anti-litigation movement sponsored by large institutional defendants. Surprisingly, however, state courts have not
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followed this pattern.339 The states emulated and indeed cribbed
federal procedural law for decades until the 1980s.340 Since then,
they have aggressively rejected prodefendant federal changes in
their local rules and criticized federal efforts to close access to
court.341 For example, in 1986 Professors John Oakley and Arthur
Coon found that twenty-three states were “federal replica jurisdictions” in that they adopted the federal rules almost wholesale.342 By 2003, Professor Oakley found the opposite, noting that
“it is arguable that there are no longer any true replicas of the
[Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] to be found among the local
procedural systems of the fifty states.”343 The states have not emulated the prodefendant changes to pleading standards, class actions, and jurisdictional rules.344 The third era has brought state
courts that refuse to enact prodefendant procedural reforms and
remain relatively proplaintiff.345
The growing procedural gulf between state and federal
courts—evidence of a proplaintiff vs. prodefendant drift—is even
more apparent in the composition and actions of the committees
that manage the rules of procedure. Professors Stephen Burbank
and Sean Farhang have shown that the Federal Rules Advisory
Committee—responsible for proposing new amendments to the
Federal Rules—has become dominated by defendant-side interests since the 1980s. 346 Even though the committee tended to
adopt proplaintiff rules in the 1960s and 1970s, almost all of the
proposals put forth since 1985 have been prodefendant. 347 The
shift correlates exactly with the reforms of the third era. Burbank
notes that “[a]fter increasing in the early 1960s, the predicted
probability that a proposed amendment would favor plaintiffs declined from 87% in the mid-1960s to 19% by [2014].”348 To be sure,
much of this has been influenced by the fact that the last three
chief justices—who appoint members to the committees—have
339
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been appointed by Republican presidents (Chief Justices Warren
Burger, William Rehnquist, and John Roberts). Nonetheless, the
composition of the federal advisory committee is clearly friendlier
to defendant interests—most of the practitioner members in the
committee are now identified as corporate defense lawyers rather
than plaintiffs’ attorneys by a 2:1 ratio, a serious departure from
the prior balance in 1960.349 By contrast, and as predicted, the
state-level advisory committees include sizable representations of
the plaintiffs’ bar and a more balanced ratio (42 percent plaintiff
vs. 58 percent defendant).350 Practitioners also seem to have more
power in state advisory committees.351
To be sure, all of these changes are in the aggregate only and
elide significant heterogeneity among the states. For example,
while nineteen state courts have rejected federal courts’ plausibility pleading, Colorado, Massachusetts, Nebraska, South
Dakota, and Wisconsin, among others, have adopted that higher
standard; while state courts in Florida, New York, Oregon,
Connecticut, California, and Iowa have criticized some Supreme
Court changes to class certification, courts in twelve states have
emulated them; and while courts in around sixteen states have
expanded some theories of personal jurisdiction, others have remained attached to the federal approach. 352 This heterogeneity
is relevant but does not change the aggregate conclusions I draw
here.
The states’ failure to drift toward defendant reforms may also
be unique to procedure. In other areas, businesses (and related
interests) continue to invest heavily and more than ever to tilt
state law in their favor, including the following contexts:




349

state judicial elections;353
tort reform;354
medical malpractice rules;355

Id at 79–81.
Zachary D. Clopton, Making State Civil Procedure, 104 Cornell L Rev 1, 29 (2018).
351 Id.
352 Scott Dodson, The Gravitational Force of Federal Law, 164 U Pa L Rev 703, 711–
17 (2016); Clopton, 106 Cal L Rev at 433–34, 441–42 (cited in note 338).
353 See, for example, Clive S. Thomas, Michael L. Boyer, and Ronald J. Hrebenar,
Interest Groups and State Court Elections: A New Era and Its Challenges, 87 Judicature
135, 137 (2003).
354 See, for example, id at 140.
355 See, for example, Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Medical Malpractice Screening Panels:
An Update and Assessment, 6 J Health & Life Sci 1, 26–28 (2013).
350
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handgun manufacturer liability;356
punitive damages;357
statutes of repose;358 and
contingency fees.359

But that interest in electing a procorporate judge or shaping state
law in a variety of contexts is quite different than an interest in
the quality and funding of state courts. It is the uncoupling
of these things—competence vs. substantive law—that is
worrisome.
In sum, there is considerable evidence that state and federal
courts are diverging as expected. State courts and state civil procedure have resisted the pro–institutional defendant trend of
federal-court changes and indeed seem to have embraced proplaintiff concerns. As business defendants opt out of state court
in the third era, the stakeholder pools of both court systems have
changed; we can observe this directly in plaintiff win rates and in
the membership numbers of civil rules’ advisory committees at
both levels. At the very least, federal courts are both perceived to
be and are likely to be more prodefendant than the most proplaintiff state court that a litigant can find.360
3. Normative concerns: the one-way ratchet, the negative
feedback loop, and inefficient forum shopping.
There are at least three reasons to be normatively concerned
with plaintiff-friendly state courts and business-friendly federal
courts. First, a proplaintiff or prodefendant bias can become a
one-way ratchet. The more the two systems diverge, the more
each stakeholder group is incentivized to maintain cases in their
own court system or invest in further lobbying, making each system even more biased. The plaintiffs’ bar would continue to favor
the state judiciaries, courting state judges, and shaping state law
and procedure as a repeat player. Defendants, by contrast, would
do the same to federal courts. If optimal legal policy is the result
of a system that takes plaintiff and defendant concerns into account, we should worry about this.
356 See Thomas A. Eaton and Susette M. Talarico, Testing Two Assumptions about
Federalism and Tort Reform, 14 Yale L & Pol Rev 371, 384–85 (1996); David A. Logan,
Juries, Judges, and the Politics of Tort Reform, 83 U Cin L Rev 903, 911 (2015).
357 See Logan, 83 U Cin L Rev at 904–05 & n 8 (cited in note 356).
358 See id at 910.
359 See id at 910 & n 32.
360 I am grateful to Sam Issacharoff for his specific language here.
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Second, a divergence in counsel bias may continue to provoke
federal intervention into state judiciaries. As I discussed above,
both CAFA and SLUSA—centerpieces of the third era—were targeted at “out of control” state judiciaries. 361 They constituted a
rescue package for large institutional defendants who complained
about the proplaintiff tendencies of state courts. But CAFA and
similar statutes have a potentially destructive core. As federal intervention accelerates the one-way ratchet, the system can collapse into a negative feedback loop. The federal government may
intervene in state courts only to make those courts even more proplaintiff and federal courts more prodefendant; in time, this can
provoke further interventions with the same goals in mind. In
other words, the federal “cure” to proplaintiff state courts is worsening the alleged disease. We may find a pattern in which the
federal government designs interventions into state courts every
ten years or so with no apparent equilibrium in sight.
This pattern may be even worsened by polarization. Plaintiffs’ attorneys overwhelmingly support Democrats while large institutional defendants are associated with Republicans.362 To the
extent that state courts are increasingly allied with plaintiffs and
federal courts with defendants, this may further politicize both
institutions, corroding bipartisan support for the judiciary. Indeed, as most important legal claims are concentrated in an increasingly polarized federal judiciary, courts may become estranged from half of the population. While it is unclear whether
elected state judiciaries might either magnify or counter polarization, they are more likely than federal courts to welcome legal
innovations that benefit consumers.363
Third, a systematic divergence between state and federal
courts can lead to significant amounts of forum shopping and can
distort legal claims. Litigation is by its very nature a strategic
game; forum shopping is as old as the republic. But the one-way
ratchet and negative feedback loop may cause increasing
amounts of strategic behavior that can exacerbate current inefficiencies. For example, in a world in which the proplaintiff bias in
361

See notes 229–32 and accompanying text.
See Adam Bonica, Adam S. Chilton, and Maya Sen, The Political Ideologies of
American Lawyers, 8 J Legal Analysis 277, 281–82 (2016).
363 See Amanda Frost and Stefanie A. Lindquist, Countering the Majoritarian Difficulty, 96 Va L Rev 719, 732–40 (2010) (finding that state judicial decisions are closer to
popular preferences); Shugerman, 123 Harv L Rev at 1064 (cited in note 66) (arguing that
“elected judges face more political pressure and reach legal results more in keeping with
local public opinion than appointed judges do”).
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state court is outcome determinative, plaintiffs’ attorneys may
forgo federal claims to stay in state court. We may also see a symmetrical effort by defendants to design claims or structure their
primary behavior to end up in federal court. A system in which
litigants make decisions based on the happenstance of forum may
be optimal for procedural rules—because of competition—but
suboptimal for the substantive law. In other words, as I discuss
further below, substantive state or federal law may eventually
drift in accordance to the repeat players that choose to litigate
therein even if their choices are based on procedural rules or judicial bias.
To conclude, the third era of judicial federalism has likely
brought us systematic biases between state and federal courts in
favor of plaintiffs vs. defendants. The stakeholder pools for each
court system may now look very different. And these differences
may, in turn, cause inefficient legal strategies.
B.

The Perils of Litigant Flight and Underfunded Judiciaries

When large institutional litigants have the power to opt out
of state court, there is a second potentially harmful effect that I
address here: institutional litigants lose interest in maintaining
well-funded state judiciaries and, by consequence, state-court finances decay. Although lobbying for efficient procedures and
skilled judges is in the interest of large litigants, their lobbying
efforts may generate positive externalities insofar as they improve the quality of the courts for everyone. Once these litigants
depart, they may take their beneficial lobbying with them, leading to a classic political economy problem in which states are left
with dispersed litigants who often do not know in advance that
they will need competent state courts.
1. Businesses as court stakeholders.
Let’s begin with a basic premise—businesses care significantly about the legal system and the judiciary. As an initial matter, businesses are by far the largest consumers of the US legal
industry.364 Indeed, “Whereas in 1975 legal effort devoted to corporate and organizational clients comprised 53% of all legal effort,
by 1995 this figure had risen to 64%.”365 Businesses run the gamut

364
365

Dunworth and Rogers, 21 L & Soc Inquiry at 497, 517 (cited in note 291).
Hadfield, 123 Harv L Rev at 1284 (cited in note 292).
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of legal claims, from torts and products liability lawsuits, to intellectual property, contracts, and tax claims. 366 In one survey,
around 85 percent of companies reported that a states’ litigation
setting influences significant business decisions.367
Beyond just taking a general interest, businesses and their
law firms claim to care about judicial competence and speedy case
resolutions. This concern comes through in a variety of initiatives.
For example, as explained below, the Chamber of Commerce rates
states on the “quality” of their judiciaries, including the “competence” of judges and political influence on judicial decisions,
among other factors.368 Perhaps most surprisingly, the Chamber
of Commerce has been a strong supporter of higher pay for federal
and state judges, claiming that “highly desirable and qualified potential judicial nominees” are important because judges handle
“more and more complex commercial cases.”369 Stories abound of
large businesses that have lobbied state legislatures for higher
court funding, including BMW’s and Boeing’s efforts to increase
South Carolina’s judicial budget.370 And, as discussed above, studies surveying defense attorney forum choices consistently find a
preference for federal courts because they perceive them to be
more “competent.”371
There is little doubt that businesses prefer judges that decide
cases in a way that helps businesses (and harms consumers), but
given that a sizable slice of judicial dockets involve business
vs. business claims, 372 businesses also want skilled judges who
can handle complex cases in a speedy manner. In business-tobusiness litigation, parties prefer sophisticated courts that can
engage in high quality, efficient, and streamlined dispute resolution. These business cases generate an incentive for corporate defendants to maximize efficiency and not necessarily to bias the

366

See id at 1287–90.
2017 Lawsuit Climate Survey: Ranking the States *14 (Harris Poll, Sept 12, 2017),
archived at http://perma.cc/3CUH-QXBW (Ranking the States).
368 The study is based on a survey of general counsel at the largest companies (over
$100 million in revenues). Id at *7.
369 Letter on Federal Judiciary Compensation (US Chamber of Commerce, June 7,
2007), archived at http://perma.cc/UGW4-SGVN (Letter from R. Bruce Josten to Minority
Leader Rep John Boehner).
370 See Funding Justice: Strategies and Messages for Restoring Court Funding *17
(National Center for State Courts, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/58EW-S32K.
371 Miller, 41 Am U L Rev at 433 (cited in note 265).
372 Schwartz, 65 DePaul L Rev at 657 (cited in note 292).
367
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process.373 That is why multiple studies have found that “[i]n examining the questions comprising the judicial qualities factor . . .
judicial competency was by far the most important reason cited
for defense attorneys’ forum selection.”374
There are several prominent examples of this preference for
competence. Delaware, for one, has built a brand as a corporate
litigation haven because, among other things, its courts and
judges are perceived as highly competent in solving complex business disputes.375 Similarly, when two dozen states sought to bring
back business litigants to state court—because they were fleeing
to federal courts and arbitration—their primary strategy was to
create business courts with devoted judges, speedier dockets, and
streamlined procedural rules.376 The New York Court of Appeals
judges have acknowledged a complaint commonly voiced by the
American Corporate Counsel Association,377 that businesses preferred to litigate in federal court to “escape the delays too often
encountered in our overburdened State courts.”378 This business
desire for speedier tribunals pushed state courts to streamline
complex litigation.379 Even more, businesses that prefer arbitration to litigation routinely claim that an arbitrator’s expertise and
the speed of the process are among the most important benefits
of arbitration.380 All in all, there is significant direct and indirect
evidence that business-to-business litigation creates incentives
for efficient dispute resolution.
There are also other theoretical reasons to believe that businesses should lobby for efficient procedures rather than just
prodefendant law. Business lobbying for prodefendant state law
has an inherent limit; once state law becomes too defendant
friendly, plaintiffs may forum shop away from those courts. This
means that lobbying to make the law prodefendant is partly selfdefeating. Instead, it may be better for businesses to lobby for
373

I thank William Hubbard for helping me think through this.
Miller, 41 Am U L Rev at 414 (cited in note 265).
375 Omari Scott Simmons, Delaware’s Global Threat, 41 J Corp L 217, 228 (2015).
376 See Zambrano, 70 Stan L Rev at 1811–12 (cited in note 9).
377 See Board of Directors’ Recommendation (American Corporate Counsel Association, adopted June 13, 1996) (Wayback Machine 2019), archived at http://perma.cc/2ZVQ
-Q68S.
378 Judith S. Kaye, The State of the Judiciary, 1993 12–13 (New York State Unified
Court System, Jan 1994).
379 See id.
380 See Thomas J. Stipanowich and J. Ryan Lamare, Living with ADR: Evolving Perceptions and Use of Mediation, Arbitration, and Conflict Management in Fortune 1000
Corporations, 19 Harv Negot L Rev 1, 39 (2014).
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more efficient courts since that generates benefits for defendants
without discouraging plaintiffs.
To the extent that businesses do in fact lobby for better judicial services, speedier dockets, and better-prepared judges, they
improve social welfare for everybody else who uses the courts.
One of the crucial elements in this logic is that the judiciary is a
nonexcludable public good. Outside of specialized courts, most
state-court judges are generalists. When a state court hires a
faster, more competent state judge, that can benefit any member
of the public who uses that court, including criminal defendants,
consumers, and employees. That is why empirical measures of judicial quality often focus on a judge’s “productivity” and efficient
caseload management without differentiating among different
substantive areas.381 And that is also why a long line of distinguished judges, from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr to Judge
Richard Posner and Judge Diane Wood, have defended the value
of generalist judges who can “enrich one field with insights from
another.”382 Judge Wood has argued that “judges [ ] are specialists
in ‘judging,’” 383 and Justice Holmes claimed that all legal cases
required the same skill, from “railroad business” to “an admiralty
case [ ] mining law and so on.”384 Indeed, the public choice literature has cast doubt on the idea of “court capture” precisely because it would be highly inefficient to invest resources in an attempt to capture a generalist judge (who may or may not rule over
a particular party’s legal wrangle).385
381 See William G. Young and Jordan M. Singer, Bench Presence: Toward a More Complete Model of Federal District Court Productivity, 118 Penn St L Rev 55, 63–67 (2013);
Stephen J. Choi and G. Mitu Gulati, Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice: An Empirical Ranking of Judge Performance, 78 S Cal L Rev 23, 32 (2004); Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu
Gulati, and Eric A. Posner, Are Judges Overpaid? A Skeptical Response to the Judicial
Salary Debate, 1 J Legal Analysis 47, 49 (2009). But see generally Marin K. Levy, Kate
Stith, and José A. Cabranes, The Costs of Judging Judges by the Numbers, 28 Yale L &
Pol Rev 313 (2010) (arguing that judicial rankings are misguided).
382 Richard A. Posner, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Survive until 1984? An Essay on Delegation and Specialization of the Judicial Function, 56 S Cal L Rev 761, 789
(1983). See also Guido Calabresi, The Current, Subtle––and Not So Subtle––Rejection of
an Independent Judiciary, 4 U Pa J Const L 637, 639–40 (2002) (arguing that generalist
judges are valuable because they interrogate the assumptions of “experts,” who might
have “reasons for pleasing the then-majority or the then-power structure”); Wood, 50 SMU
L Rev at 1767–68 (cited in note 320) (noting that generalist judges apply due process as a
consistent principle).
383 Wood, 50 SMU L Rev at 1768 (cited in note 320).
384 Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: His Book Notices and
Uncollected Letters and Papers 163 (Gaunt 2003) (H. Shriver, ed).
385 See Anderson, 59 BC L Rev at 1571–72 (cited in note 321) (noting that some argue
generalist courts are less susceptible to capture).
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The next step in the logic here is that once businesses gain
the power to opt out of state courts, they may lose any incentive
to lobby for a more efficient state judiciary but retain an incentive
to lobby for bias. Instead of devoting resources to lobby or improve
state courts, businesses should reallocate those expenditures toward federal courts. Lobbying funds are zero sum—as more go to
the federal government or federal judicial events, fewer dollars
can be devoted to state politicians. Of course, businesses cannot
fully opt out of state court—they must still deal with thousands
of state cases. But if the nature of those cases has shifted from a
mix of individual lawsuits against businesses and business-tobusiness litigation to mostly consumer and personal injury–type
cases or even just smaller stakes cases, then even if businesses
are investing in the state courts, their incentives have changed.
This is especially so if the largest cases are now in federal court,
like the trades secret litigation discussed above.386 The larger the
stakes, the greater the incentive to invest in shaping federal law
and procedure.387 Moreover, efficiency may no longer be a goal if
a party is overwhelmingly a defendant and almost never a plaintiff; in fact, it might be the reverse. It may become less important
to invest in support personnel and facilities for the courts, and,
instead, businesses would have an increased incentive to lobby for
probusiness judges.
The third era of judicial federalism allows businesses to opt
out of state court and rededicate their lobbying toward federal
courts. Thus, we should expect the Chamber of Commerce to decrease their lobbying for better funded state courts or to plan
fewer events that criticize overburdened judicial dockets. By consequence, we may expect diminished positive externalities from
business lobbying and, perhaps, the finding above, that state
courts are in relative financial decay compared to federal courts.
They simply lack sufficient political support. Of course, statecourt decay has been influenced by:




386
387

constitutional balanced budget requirements;
the diverse obligations of state governments to fund
other public services like police and schools;
broader political dynamics at the state level, including
the weakening of public sector unions and political
polarization;

See note 299.
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generalized austerity; and
a long-term shift toward
regulation.388
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federal

government

Even if other areas of state governments have suffered worse
budget cuts, the judiciary should in theory be more resilient and
resistant to budget cuts. Regardless, as Justice Frankfurter noted
a hundred years ago:
[I]s it wise to withdraw from the impulses to reform of state
tribunals influential litigants who, in diversity litigation,
now avoid state courts? Such litigants and their counsel
ought to have every incentive to make state tribunals worthy,
and their administration fair and impartial.389
More recently, the former President of the New York Bar Association—who noticed this dynamic in the early 1990s—put it even
more bluntly:
[W]e believed it was important for the state court system to
have the business community as one of its many constituents.
To put it another way, we believed it was unhealthy for commercial litigants, in increasing numbers, to bypass the New
York state courts, and therefore to have little interest in the
strength and vitality of those courts.390
One possible response to this loss of businesses as beneficial
stakeholders is that as state courts become relatively proplaintiff,
state law may drift toward more normatively desirable outcomes—for example, more proconsumer doctrines—swamping
any loss of judicial competence. Corporate lobbyists may have too
much power anyways. Even if one agrees with this view, the normative concern is that, as discussed above, businesses cannot opt
out of state law; they can only opt out of state court. This means
that they should continue to have significant incentives to lobby
for prodefendant and anti-consumer state law;391 and they should
only lose the incentive to lobby for prodefendant state procedures,
speedier dockets, better funding, and expert judges.

388
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391 Eaton and Talarico, 14 Yale L & Pol Rev at 391, 395–97 (cited in note 356) (noting
the impact of business lobbying on state law tort reform).
389

2174

The University of Chicago Law Review

[86:2101

Indeed, the ability of businesses to opt out only from state
courts may perversely throw the baby out with the bathwater. Society may lose the beneficial effects that businesses had on state
courts and procedure yet retain the normatively worrisome effects
of prodefendant and procorporate law. And there is evidence that,
despite businesses’ increased focus on federal courts,392 they have
also boosted their efforts to shape state substantive law.393
Another potential response is that, in theory, we cannot know
with certainty if the net effect of business lobbying is positive for
the entire legal system (rather than just for state courts). Insofar
as departing businesses now lobby for better federal courts, it
may be desirable to encourage further emigration. Maybe decaying state courts are not a social bad at the end of the day. This is
an important rejoinder. Below, however, I argue that distributional consequences and a concern for consumers may weigh
against federal expansion.
2. Normative and distributional consequences.
An important concern with the loss of businesses as beneficial
stakeholders of state procedure is the consequences for the vast
majority of groups that are stuck in state court. There may be
clear winners and losers. As previously discussed, federal expansion allows large institutional litigants to move to federal courts
or arbitration. With this third-era shift, businesses are potentially better off in federal court or arbitral tribunals than they
used to be in state courts. But here’s the rub—other state-court
stakeholders cannot take advantage of the third era’s changes in
the same manner. At the end of the day, there are approximately
seventeen million civil cases every year in state courts and only
three hundred thousand in federal courts.394 Most groups cannot
easily remove their cases out of state courts.
Assuming that state courts are in fact in relative decay, the
small stakeholders that avoid the exodus toward privatized arbitration are essentially stuck with judiciaries that are worsening
relative to federal courts. They may not mind less competent
judges because their legal matters are simpler, but they will likely
mind a lack of predictability, slow legal process, and courts that
392

See notes 209–12 and accompanying text.
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are so crowded or underfunded that they cannot even keep their
doors open. Moreover, to the extent courts lose funding, they may
increasingly rely on higher court fees or surcharges, again placing
the cost on all court users. The net effect of business emigration
may be to concentrate competence and efficient procedures in federal court where only large institutional litigants benefit and others are worse off. This may be socially harmful.
Even more fundamentally, worsening funding for state courts
can shape the content of state-court dockets and close access to
court for low stakes litigants. In an empirical study of state supreme court cases, Professors Paul Brace and Melinda Gann Hall
found a significant positive relationship between state-court professionalism—determined by, among other things, budgets and
legal resources—and docket space devoted to disadvantaged litigants. In other words, the more state courts lack professionalism,
funding, and legal resources (among other things), the less likely
they are to devote attention to cases involving small stakes litigants.395 And there is even evidence that this may harm case outcomes for disadvantaged litigants.396
Even if these smaller stakeholders prefer more competent
state judiciaries, they are likely out of luck: they face free-rider
problems, their interests are too diffuse, and they do not have the
focused motivation necessary for sustained lobbying.397 Indeed, as
the Brennan Center has recognized, “courts have no natural public constituency. Many voters believe government should spend
more on schools, roads, and public safety. Few believe the courts
need more money.”398 It is “very clear that most Americans are
simply not supportive of appeals for court funding at present.”399
Unlike some other policy areas, “courts are not ‘sexy’ in the eyes
of the public. They have few allies and fewer advocates in budgeting. Elected officials do not get much credit for funding

395 Paul Brace and Melinda Gann Hall, Haves versus Have Nots in the State Supreme
Courts: Allocating Docket Space and Wins in Power Asymmetric Cases, 35 Law & Soc Rev
393, 407 (2001) (“An increase of supreme court professionalization by one standard deviation is estimated to increase the amount of docket space devoted to these have-not cases
by 6%.”).
396 Id at 409.
397 See Olson, The Logic of Collective Action at 35–36 (cited in note 306).
398 Funding Justice at *2 (cited in note 370).
399 Daniel J. Hall and Lee Suskin, Responding to the Crisis—Reengineering Court
Governance and Structure, 47 New Eng L Rev 505, 537 (2013).
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courts.”400 By contrast to the diffused interests of the general public, large businesses form a highly motivated group that can successfully shape the judiciary. And the key point is that either way
businesses will lobby for prodefendant law. We might as well have
them lobby for better courts, too.
To be sure, plaintiffs’ attorneys also can and do shape state
judiciaries. But surveys of plaintiffs’ attorneys demonstrate that
they place less emphasis on competence than defense-side
firms.401 Moreover, as designers of the New York Commercial Division found, plaintiffs’ attorneys and the state bar often have,
like businesses, targeted concerns that do not extend to the entire
judiciary.402 Much of this may be due to the asymmetry discussed
above: there is no business-to-business litigation equivalent on
the plaintiffs’ side that can create incentives for “grow the pie”
investments in state courts. Thus, it is unclear that increasing
the power of plaintiffs’ attorneys over state courts can make up
for the loss of competency-obsessed business defendants. Public
choice logic predicts that as businesses opt out of state courts,
everyone else may subsequently be worse off.
C.

State Courts May Lose the Ability to Shape State Law

Federal monopolization of state claims also removes the ability of state courts to shape the common law. As Professors Sam
Issacharoff and Catherine Sharkey worried a decade ago, because
the largest cases are often litigated in federal court—including
state-law claims under diversity or supplemental jurisdiction—
state courts may no longer have the docket mix that allows them
to innovate on cutting-edge areas.403 This corrodes the common
law–making power of elected state judges, prosecutors, and attorneys general, with harmful consequences.
One of the most important tasks of a common law court is to
generate precedent. The resolution of active cases allows stakeholders to predict the behavior of future courts, and allows market actors to structure their primary behavior in accordance with

400 Gordon M. Griller, Future Trends in State Courts: The Quiet Battle for ProblemSolving Courts *62 (National Center for State Courts, 2011), archived at
http://perma.cc/7VFK-SKX6.
401 Miller, 41 Am U L Rev at 414 (cited in note 265).
402 Alcott, 11 Jud Notice at 52 (cited in note 390).
403 See Issacharoff and Sharkey, 53 UCLA L Rev at 1419–20 (cited in note 10);
Issacharoff and Marotta-Wurgler, 67 UCLA L Rev at *18 (cited in note 238).
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judicial rulings. 404 Almost every model of how courts operate
views the generation of precedent as a fundamental output that
can increase social welfare.405 In a properly working common law
system, the generation of precedent must be continuous because
societal changes require new legal rules and regimes that can
guide market actors. New technologies, tax regulations or corporate organizational methods, for example, have to be integrated
into old common law frameworks, regulatory regimes, or statutory claims. A properly working common law system requires legislators and common law courts that together successfully shape
the law.
Given the inherent value of precedent, scholars have long argued that any process that weakens the power of courts to continuously generate precedent might be harmful to the common law
and social welfare. Professor Owen Fiss warned in 1984 that the
systematic growth of settlements—in lieu of adjudication—could
deprive courts of the power to “explicate and give force to the values embodied in authoritative texts such as the Constitution and
statutes: to interpret those values and to bring reality into accord
with them.”406 More recently, Professor Myriam Gilles has argued
that arbitration precludes common law development because it is
confidential and nonprecedential—“Put simply: law cannot grow
in the darkness with which arbitration shrouds its activities, and
when law ceases to grow, it stagnates and eventually ceases to be
(or be relevant).”407 The logic is simple: a process like settlements
or arbitration can deprive courts of the necessary raw material to
develop, explicate, update, and improve the common law. When
that happens, we may worry that “the common law . . . cease[s] to
be a living organism.”408
It is entirely possible that the emigration of large cases from
state to federal court may stunt state common law.409 Like settlements and arbitration, the removal of state cases to federal court
404 This vision straddles the famous disagreement between Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes Jr and Professor H.L.A. Hart. Contrast Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr, The Path of the
Law, 10 Harv L Rev 457, 458–59 (1897) (arguing that the law should be defined as a prediction of court behavior), with H.L.A Hart, The Concept of Law 39 (Oxford 1961) (critiquing Holmes’s prediction theory of law).
405 See, for example, Landes and Posner, 8 J Legal Stud at 236–40 (cited in note 313).
406 Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L J 1073, 1085 (1984).
407 Gilles, 2016 Ill L Rev at 413 (cited in note 284). See also Glover, 124 Yale L at 3058
n 23 (cited in note 283).
408 See Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract
Law, 71 Fordham L Rev 761, 786 (2002).
409 Zambrano, 70 Stan L Rev at 1878–79 (cited in note 9).
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“deprives” state judiciaries of the power to “explicate and give
force to the values embodied” in their statutes and law. Under
Erie, federal courts must apply state law in diversity cases.410 But
their rulings are not precedential for state courts; they are inert.
This was not an important concern before 1980, when federal
courts had a relatively small diversity and supplemental jurisdiction docket. But in the third era of judicial federalism, this may
become a problem. Federal courts are now monopolizing the largest and most complex cases. And it is specifically those cases—
large class actions, complex litigation, and monetarily significant
claims—that are most likely to involve sophisticated litigants
with innovative arguments, appeals, and creative legal strategies. These are the cases that shape the common law.
Because state courts still retain seventeen million civil cases,
a stunted common law may not be a systemic issue—we may only
observe it in areas that produce few cases that tend to end up in
federal court. 411 According to a study of state-court dockets,
61 percent of cases involve contract law questions (mostly debt
collection, landlord/tenant, and foreclosures) while only 6 percent
involve torts (mostly automobile accidents) and 2 percent real
property.412 Most of the seventeen million cases, however, are dismissed (35 percent) or end in settlement (10 percent) while only
4 percent are adjudicated on the merits and 1 percent in summary judgment.413 If federal courts are taking over cases in this
narrow band of adjudicated cases, they could have a significant
effect on the common law.
Moreover, federal expansion’s effect may be particularly observable in certain narrow yet cutting-edge areas of the common
law. For example, the Fifth Circuit recently noted in the context
of a smartphone products liability case against Apple that “where
defendants operate nationwide in highly consolidated industries,
like Apple in the smartphone industry, the rules governing federal courts in diversity cases may substantially close state courts
to novel claims. . . . The result may be a legal system less generative than normal.” 414 Similarly, a study by Professors Sam
Issacharoff and Florencia Marotta-Wugler—that emerged as part
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Erie, 304 US at 78–80.
NCSC Report at *6 n 36 (cited in note 4).
Id at 8.
Id at 20. Although 26 percent ended in a judgment. Id.
Meador v Apple, 911 F3d 260, 267 n 6 (5th Cir 2018).
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of broader work for the American Law Institute’s draft restatement of consumer contracts—recently found that in a sector of
electronic consumer contracts post-CAFA, “there is virtually no
contract case law at the state level, and [ ] the driving doctrinal
work is being done at the federal appellate level.”415 The authors
conclude: “[T]he consequence of the dominance of the federal forum is that the common law is being elaborated in federal court
in suits arising under diversity jurisdiction. In turn, those federal
courts are largely bereft of any state law moorings,” leading to a
hollowing out of the common law.416 These smartphone productsliability and electronic consumer-contract cases are precisely the
kind of cases in which we may observe a stagnating common law.
And this does not even account for the millions of cases that have
been privatized through arbitration.
We should care about these narrow, cutting-edge areas of law
because they are the ones that benefit the most from crosspollination by both state and federal courts and a competition between legal innovations. State courts and judges have thrived in
the past exactly at times of technological transformation. It was
an unprecedented automobile liability case in 1916, for example,
that put Justice Benjamin Cardozo, then Judge on the New York
Court of Appeals, “on the map.”417 Similar changes in the context
of mass-torts cases and products liability have required multiple
state and federal approaches—often benefitting from diverse
treatment and an exchange of legal innovations by different
courts. A federalized common law, by contrast, shifts common-law
development from fifty separate state courts to a few federal district and circuit courts.418 While this may promote uniformity, it
diminishes cross-pollination and innovation, potentially harming
the quality of the common law.
Losing innovative common-law cases even in narrow areas
also has the potential to harm the stature of state courts in front
of their own legislatures and legal communities. Traditionally,
commentators have worried that federal “Erie guesses” of state
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Issacharoff and Marotta-Wurgler, 67 UCLA L Rev at *22 (cited in note 238).
Id at *1.
417 Goldberg, 34 Touro L Rev at 149 (cited in note 11). See generally Macpherson v
Buick Motor Co, 111 NE 1050 (NY 1916).
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law can be inaccurate and place state law in the hands of nonexpert federal judges. 419 But those concerns are antiquated and
overly formalistic—there’s no reason to think federal judges decide state law issues in an unfair way, nor that they are so inaccurate as to verge on arbitrariness. A more serious concern is that
federal expansion over state law may weaken incentives for the
government and private actors to invest in state judiciaries. 420
The issue, in other words, is one of state-court stature, credibility,
funding, and legitimacy. If state judges lose the ability to innovate
on cutting edge areas of state law, that can affect their ability to
attract high caliber judges and budgets. 421 Historically, state
courts have burnished their reputation by creating or updating
the common law to address unforeseen disasters. From railroad
and automobile liability, to mass torts and consumer rights, state
courts have justified their role as an integral part of a state’s democratic polity through common law–making. Federal expansion
places this role at risk. State legislators may not invest in state
courts that do not enjoy the admiration of the local bar and cannot
even successfully address current issues. Unlike the vibrancy
that exists in Delaware—where courts are seen as an integral
part of a larger and highly profitable “brand”—the typical state
judiciary may not be able to maintain the requisite stature within
their own government, leading to a loss of financial support.
All of these things together are especially worrisome insofar
as isolated federal courts are unlikely to respond or welcome legal
innovations that benefit plaintiff or consumer side interests. As a
whole, we may worry about stunted development of the common
law.
***
In this Part, I highlighted several potential drawbacks to federal expansion and its connection to the decay of state courts, including: (1) a growing divergence between state and federal
courts with regards to proplaintiff or prodefendant procedural
rules; (2) the potential hollowing out of institutional litigant
stakeholders at the state-court level; and (3) the states’ diminishing ability to shape the common law. These do not represent the

419 Clark, 145 U Pa L Rev at 1499 (cited in note 201) (“[A] federal court’s ‘prediction’
of state law frequently devolves into little more than a choice among competing policy
considerations.”).
420 Consider Resnik, 162 U Pa L Rev at 1824 (cited in note 283).
421 Consider Posner, 56 S Cal L Rev at 777 (cited in note 382) (arguing that abolishing
diversity jurisdiction would undermine the generalist nature of the federal judiciary).
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universe of potential concerns. But they highlight important perverse consequences of federal expansion for judicial federalism.
III. THE BENEFITS OF FEDERAL EXPANSION IN THE THIRD ERA
No analysis of the third era of judicial federalism would be
complete without grappling with its benefits for the judicial system. Unlike the benefits that most scholars have highlighted,
however, I focus here on three underappreciated positive changes.
First, federal expansion better aligns each court system with its
own comparative advantages and institutional competence: federal courts for large and complex cases and state courts for small
and local cases. Second, expansion pits state and federal courts in
direct competition with each other for business cases, potentially
fostering innovation and reforms. And finally, federal expansion
allows federal courts to more effectively police state courts’ externalization of costs. Below, I address these three benefits in turn.
A.

Comparative Institutional Competence and Judicial
Federalism

In this Section, I argue that federal courts can resolve larger
cases more efficiently because of their national procedural powers. For example, in the context of multidistrict litigation (MDLs),
class actions, and transnational litigation, federal courts have developed procedures to resolve large scale litigation with maximal
efficiency, low coordination costs, and economies of scale. Moreover, federal courts are significantly better equipped to solve large
and complex cases because—as Professor Gil Seinfeld has argued—they provide franchise-like benefits: procedural homogeneity, high professionalism, and predictable competence. 422 Thus,
the third era has efficiently placed large cases in the judiciary
best equipped to host them.
The traditional justifications for federal jurisdiction are
overly simplistic. The conventional account is that federal courts
ought to decide federal question cases because they can avoid the
potential biases of state courts and can provide uniform
interpretations of federal law with greater expertise. 423 This
“‘bias-uniformity-expertise’ mantra” 424 has recently come under
422 Gil Seinfeld, The Federal Courts as a Franchise: Rethinking the Justifications for
Federal Question Jurisdiction, 97 Cal L Rev 95, 133–48 (2009).
423 Id at 103.
424 Id at 158.
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withering criticism as one-dimensional, based on misguided
premises, and simply inaccurate.425 There is little if any evidence
that state courts are systematically biased against federal rights,
that they provide a level of disuniformity that the Supreme Court
cannot remedy or that federal courts can somehow avoid, or that
they lack sufficient expertise. If anything, some have argued that
since at least the 1980s, state courts have paradoxically been
more open than federal courts to certain constitutional claims, including gay rights, religious liberty, and criminal procedure.426
Despite the recent failings of the conventional account, federal courts do indeed enjoy significant comparative advantages in
certain areas, including national procedural efficiency. 427 Over
the last five decades, federal courts have developed a series of procedures to resolve large-scale litigation with maximal efficiency.
There are at least three examples: MDLs, class actions, and
transnational litigation. In MDL cases, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation can aggregate thousands of claims—based
around similar facts and against the same defendants—from
around the country and assign them to a single judge for all pretrial matters. Most cases assigned to MDL are settled, obviating
any need for thousands of trials around the country. Nothing like
this could exist at the state level. Due to limits on personal jurisdiction, a state court cannot aggregate claims from different
states that are not directly linked to in-state conduct, making a
state equivalent of MDLs nearly impossible.428 Moreover, because
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, there is no obvious procedural unfairness in coalescing thousands of cases from around the
country in a single forum. By contrast, moving cases across state

425 Id at 109–10. But see Redish, 78 Va L Rev at 1787 & n 104 (cited in note 10)
(“There is no real inconsistency between desiring state court input into the shaping of
federal law, yet simultaneously believing that federal courts are, on the whole, the superior forum for the adjudication of federal law.”).
426 See, for example, William B. Rubenstein, The Myth of Superiority, 16 Const Comment 599, 621–23 (1999) (“Pro-gay litigants have met with surprising success in state
courts in the past decades.”). However, in the past two decades, the Supreme Court has
been more open to these types of constitutional claims. See generally, for example, Santa
Fe Independent School District v Doe, 530 US 290 (2000); Lawrence v Texas, 539 US 558
(2003); Obergefell v Hodges, 135 S Ct 2584 (2015); Carpenter v United States, 138 S Ct
2206 (2016).
427 David L. Shapiro, Federal Diversity Jurisdiction: A Survey and a Proposal, 91
Harv L Rev 317, 328 (1977).
428 See generally Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v Superior Court, 137 S Ct 1773 (2017).
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lines runs the risks of procedural disuniformity and outcomedeterminative differences.429
There is a similar sort of national procedural efficiency at
play in large class-action cases and transnational litigation. In
these cases, federal courts benefit from the ability to coordinate
litigation with other federal courts for discovery or pretrial matters. District courts can easily enforce subpoenas issued by other
courts; they can transfer venue to other district courts; and judges
can even sit in different districts by designation. Additionally,
complex cases routinely involve foreign parties, foreign laws, and
documents stored abroad. To address these matters, federal
courts have developed a lengthy jurisprudence on international
comity that is unmatched at the state-court level.430 And federal
courts have shown high competency in considering issues of foreign affairs and the application of federal law in other countries.
Federal courts sometimes even invite amicus briefs from the
State Department on questions of diplomacy and foreign affairs,
a relationship with the executive that seems nonexistent at the
state level.
Another important benefit of large litigation in the federal
judiciary is that federal courts operate what Seinfeld calls a “national franchise” that provides a triumvirate of benefits: procedural homogeneity, professionalism, and predictable competence.431 First, the homogeneous federal rules of civil procedure
provide familiarity, predictability, and the opportunity for litigants to build and develop expertise.432 This is especially useful
for large corporate defendants with offices across the country or
internationally. The transaction costs of employing local law
firms with expertise in state procedural systems is high. It is
much more efficient for large organizations to work with one or a
few national law firms that have national expertise in federal
court. This is why the literature on attorney preferences usually
finds that corporate defense attorneys place a lot of importance
on this benefit and almost always prefer federal courts.433

429

Seinfeld, 97 Cal L Rev at 137 (cited in note 422).
See Diego Zambrano, A Comity of Errors: The Rise, Fall, and Return of International Comity in Transnational Discovery, 34 Berkeley J Intl L 157, 161–62 (2016).
431 Seinfeld, 97 Cal L Rev at 137–39 (cited in note 422).
432 See id at 100.
433 See id at 142–43.
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Second, large institutional defendants may prefer federal
courts because they provide a predictable degree of professionalism and level the playing field between insiders and outsiders. All
federal judges are selected through the same mechanism; are life
tenured; sit as officers of the United States; and receive generous
salaries.434 This gives federal legal proceedings a remarkable degree of uniformity throughout the country. For large organizations and law firms that operate in multiple states, this is a professional, cultural, psychological, and financial boon. Moreover,
federal courts have developed a culture that is geared toward professional treatment of complex cases. 435 As Professor Seinfeld
notes, “In contemporary legal culture, federal court is the place
where important matters are decided by important people for important people.”436 This culture has managed to generate a selfsustaining degree of professionalism, high judicial talent, and devotion to the fair resolution of complex cases.
Within this high prestige and professional atmosphere, federal judges are incentivized to maintain a good reputation among
national lawyers, encouraging them to further invest significant
resources in resolving complex cases. By contrast, “standards of
professionalism among state courts, particularly at the trial level,
are lower than they are among federal courts, and the likelihood
of local, personal relationships coming into play in the far smaller
trial-level units of the state judiciaries is higher.”437 This ensures
a continuing perception that federal courts are better prepared to
deal with complex cases.
All of this means that federal courts may be better placed to
resolve exactly the kinds of cases that the third era of judicial federalism has foisted on them: large, complex, national cases with
high monetary stakes. The third era’s federal expansion means
that legally skilled federal judges are channeled toward the kinds
of cases that require sophisticated understanding of procedural
complexities. At the end of the day, the system efficiently price
discriminates for entry—larger claims in federal court and
smaller claims in state court. This may be the optimal distribution of cases in accordance with skill, size, and degree of
sophistication.

434
435
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See Neuborn, 90 Harv L Rev at 1121 & n 61, 1127–28 (cited in note 11).
Seinfeld, 97 Cal L Rev at 140–42 (cited in note 422).
Id at 141 (emphasis in original).
Id at 144.
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State-Federal Competition May Fuel Judicial Improvements

Federal expansion has also produced unintended consequences that may be beneficial for state courts. Chief among
these, and perhaps most surprisingly, is that many state courts
have not only competed for plaintiffs’ firms’ attention—they have
also taken up the challenge of competing with the federal courts
for business cases. In doing so, there is tentative evidence that
those court systems have reformed and streamlined their procedural rules.
Under a regulatory view of federalism, the vertical division
of power between the states and federal government allows businesses to choose whether to be regulated by one government or
the other.438 When businesses lose a battle to avoid regulation—
or fail to convince state governments to raise barriers against
competitors—they can lobby for federal preemption or can move
to other states.439 This effectively gives businesses multiple bites
at the regulatory apple. On the one hand, this brings duplicative
costs when both the states and federal governments regulate the
same activity or unnecessarily trample on each other’s work. On
the other hand, this fosters healthy competition among the states
and between the states and the federal government. Each government unit has an incentive to compete because they want to maintain citizens, businesses, regulatory power, and large budgets.
And this kind of competition can foster beneficial innovation.
As I have argued elsewhere, judicial federalism may follow
the same economic logic as regulatory federalism.440 State governments (and courts) are incentivized to compete with other state
and federal courts for business litigation by engaging in “forum
selling.”441 Business cases can produce direct and indirect benefits, including revenues from court fees, business investment, fees
for the local bar, and positive spillover effects for banks and related businesses. 442 This is precisely why Delaware’s business
courts are an integral part of the Delaware brand. Maintaining
complex cases can also provide increased prestige for local judges
and energy for the legal system. Many judges from around the
438 See Keith N. Hylton, An Economic Perspective on Preemption, 53 BC L Rev 203,
206–07 (2012) (characterizing preemption as a regulatory regime choice).
439 See id at 213 n 39.
440 Zambrano, 70 Stan L Rev at 1846–47 (cited in note 9).
441 See, for example, Daniel Klerman and Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S Cal L Rev
241, 288 (2016) (discussing efforts by state courts to attract patent litigation).
442 Zambrano, 70 Stan L Rev at 1844–45 (cited in note 9).
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country have explicitly recognized that a loss of business litigation can sap vibrancy from state courts.443
Once we accept that the states and federal government may
compete for certain cases, we may also expect these competitive
pressures to sometimes push states to reform their judicial systems in order to attract more litigation customers. To be clear, as
I noted earlier, these reforms cannot be done on a judge-by-judge
basis or through procedural rules, unlike the proplaintiff changes
previously discussed. These reforms must instead be system-wide
and led by the legislature. For instance, New York Court of Appeals judges pushed the state legislature to create specialized
business courts in the 1990s because they felt the system was decaying and businesses were increasingly litigating in federal
court.444 As one state judge mentioned, “[W]hen we’re competing
with other states for business clients, we want to one-up every
other state to get them to our state, so we try to streamline the
[dispute resolution] system.”445 Indeed, beneficial competition between the two government systems in the third era may be responsible for the creation of business courts in twenty-three
states. These courts specifically focus on reducing delays, improving docket loads, increasing the expertise of local judges, and
streamlining procedural rules. This may be a boon for corporate
litigants.
This strategy also shows how the states have segmented the
litigation market. Most states seem to have both become more
proplaintiff through their general procedural rules but at the
same time created business courts that are separate from the rest
of the litigation system to attract corporate business-to-business
litigation.446
As expected, there is some evidence that state courts have
recently improved in several respects, all seemingly related to
their treatment of business cases. The most relevant study comes
from the US Chamber of Commerce, which produces one of the
most influential rankings of state courts, based on aggregate responses by senior lawyers at large corporations (with revenues of
at least $100 million).447 The rankings have been routinely cited
443

Id at 1844.
Alcott, 11 Jud Notice at 52–53 (cited in note 390).
445 See Forced Arbitration and the Fate of the 7th Amendment: The Core of America’s
Legal System at Stake? *100 (Pound Civil Justice Institute, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/C2HY-R3DM.
446 See note 376 and accompanying text.
447 Ranking the States at *5 (cited in note 367).
444

2019]

Federal Expansion

2187

by state legislators, judicial commissions, governors, and academics.448 Surprisingly, the rankings show a dramatic improvement
in business views of the “reasonableness of state-court liability
systems in America.” 449 In 2002, nearly 60 percent of corporate
lawyers ranked their state courts as having an “Only Fair/Poor”
environment and only 40 percent as “Excellent/Pretty Good.” By
2015, the numbers had flipped; 50 percent ranked state courts as
having an “Excellent/Pretty Good” environment and in 2017 more
than 60 percent did.450 When asked specifically to grade the performance of state courts on issues like “judges’ competence,”
“[o]verall treatment of tort and contract litigation,” and “[i]mpartiality,” businesses have given courts an improving overall
score.451 To be sure, there are reasons to doubt the ranking’s accuracy, especially because it solicits input only from large businesses with profoundly biased opinions of the judicial system.452
But I use it here only to provide some evidence that state courts
have improved in one measure—their handling of business cases
and complex litigation.
C.

Avoiding State-Court Externalities and Political Pathologies

The most widely recognized benefit of federal expansion is
that it allows disfavored state minorities to access federal court.
Politically disempowered minorities in a state are by definition
powerless to shape policy through the ballot box. In a liberal democracy, it is the countermajoritarian judiciary that is supposed
to protect minorities’ legal rights. But this does not always work
in practice. Minorities may also be shunned out of the legal system, especially in polities with elected judiciaries. This double
whammy virtually ensures a denial of basic rights. It is no surprise then that biased state courts in the South had defended Jim
Crow and would not budge at the beginning of the Civil Rights

448 Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati, and Eric A. Posner, Which States Have the Best
(and Worst) High Courts? *2 (Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No 217, May
2008), archived at http://perma.cc/94UV-XTF8.
449 Ranking the States at *8 (cited in note 367).
450 Id at *13 (cited in note 367). One qualification of comparing these numbers over
time is that the Chamber of Commerce changed the polls slightly around 2015. See id
at *86.
451 Id at *94, 96.
452 See Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Judicial Hellholes, Lawsuit Climates and Bad Social
Science: Lessons from West Virginia, 110 W Va L Rev 1097, 1099 (2008) (arguing that the
rankings are not meant to reflect reality, but instead to pressure susceptible state legislatures into adopting probusiness reforms).
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movement. Federal expansion completely restructured minorities’ legal rights. With a federal cause of action under the Civil
Rights and Voting Rights Acts, minorities could gain access to a
federal forum led by an appointed judge and governed by a different procedural regime. This combination allowed minorities to
dodge local judiciaries and gain access to civil rights. Moreover, a
federal forum enlarged the relevant polity from a potentially parochial state government to the more diverse federal body. By doing this, the second and third eras provided direct benefits to minorities in most states.453
A related benefit of federal expansion is the positive effect on
commerce from increased access to federal judges. Commentators
have long noted that federal courts tend to be friendlier to interstate commerce.454 Judge Posner has theorized that even if state
governments are not biased against out-of-state interests, local
courts may nonetheless rule against out-of-staters in an attempt
to externalize the costs of intrastate conduct.455 In such a world,
diversity jurisdiction can be highly efficient because it deters
state judiciaries from assigning costs to out-of-state litigants (who
can remove their claims to federal courts at any point) and promotes more predictable interstate commerce. As two scholars recently summarized, “Congress frequently regulates activities because state regulation, or lack of regulation, of those activities
imposes external costs on neighboring states.” 456 Moreover, the
federal system’s unitary nature—under a single Supreme
Court—eases control of wayward courts that become too plaintiff
or defendant friendly, ensuring greater uniformity and fairness.
Federal expansion, in short, gives federal courts more power to
check state courts, smoothing interstate commerce and blunting
state efforts to overregulate.
IV. IMPROVING THE DISTRIBUTION OF JUDICIAL POWER
This Article has argued that judicial federalism may be just
settling into its third era, one that brings wide-ranging implications for both federal and state courts. Given the plural array of
benefits and costs of the third era, it may be difficult to discern
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an optimal distribution of judicial power. At the very least, however, we should achieve agreement on more subsidiary concerns
like state-court funding, a more coherent distribution of cases between the two systems, and the distributional consequences outlined above. If so, then the foregoing discussion suggests three
lessons:
First, reformers should focus on state-court funding. State judiciaries are weighed down by growing docket loads and a complete lack of political support. An investment in financial resources might improve the system for the small stakes litigants
who are using it the most. Reform efforts could focus on targeted
investment in complex litigation courts, higher judicial salaries,
and reforms that address judicial delays. To be sure, the process
that launched the third era was political in nature; businesses
lobbied the federal government for increased access to federal fora
and federal law because the federal judiciary was more conservative and friendlier to business interests. But the third era is
partly maintained by a persistent belief that state courts are “inferior” and “incompetent.” If this is merely false rhetoric coming
from self-interested businesses, then improving the system would
nonetheless help most litigants. And even if it is true, the remedy
cannot be to reflexively open federal courts to more and more litigants, especially because of the potential for a negative spiral.
Instead, the right approach might be to continue to concentrate
large cases in federal court but at the same time improve state
courts.
Increased federal funding for state courts may help remedy
the overburdened and underfunded nature of state judiciaries.457
As discussed above, state legislatures are unlikely to support financial investment in state courts given the existing electoral incentives. Instead, investment may have to come from the only entity with the funds to do so, the federal government itself. In
support of this idea, the 1995 Long Range Plan for Federal Courts
recognized that “improvement in state justice systems . . . may
require significant federal financial assistance to state courts.”458
Indeed, as early as 1979, Senator Ted Kennedy debated potential
action to aid state courts, noting that “[i]f, indeed, State courts do

457 Professor Judith Resnik has also called for increased funding for state courts.
Resnik, 91 Notre Dame L Rev at 1866–67 (cited in note 303).
458 Long Range Plan at *23 (cited in note 137).
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not adjudicate as satisfactorily as Federal courts, then the appropriate remedy is to improve the quality of our State courts.”459
Such an effort could take many forms, including increased funding for the State Justice Institute, which allows federal grants to
improve state-court quality.460
Second, states should focus on creating complex litigation
courts rather than simply business courts. One of the apparent
bright spots of recent reforms is the creation of specialized business tribunals. Corporate lawyers seem to agree that these courts
have improved state litigation. The problem, however, is that
these courts have segmented state judicial systems by providing
well-funded and expert judges only for business-to-business
cases. That narrow focus ignores consumers, small stakeholders,
and routine litigants. Noticing the inequality in this model, states
like California have instead created complex litigation courts that
can benefit all litigants, regardless of their specific claims. 461
These courts are fairer and extend the benefits of a better-funded
judiciary to a broader set of stakeholders.
Third, the government should consider reversing recent reforms that have contributed to the incoherence of our jurisdictional rules. Because it is difficult to gauge how all of the changes
described above cash out, reformers should focus on at least improving the coherence of the system. One of the most remarkable
failures of the first two eras of judicial federalism is that they
lacked a guiding ethos or sense of logical consistency. The first
era, for example, empowered federal courts with diversity jurisdiction purportedly to allow out-of-state litigants to avoid biased
local courts. But if bias were truly a concern, why could in-state
plaintiffs file a diversity claim in federal court against an out-ofstate defendant? There was no potential bias justification in that
kind of case.462 The second era was equally riddled with contradictions and paradoxes that the third era has extended. For example,

459 1979 JAA Hearings, 96th Cong, 1st Sess at 2 (cited in note 122) (statement of Sen
Kennedy).
460 See 42 USC § 10702(b) (enumerating the goals of the Institute); Thirtieth Anniversary Report *37 (State Justice Institute, 1984) archived at http://perma.cc/2XXX-PHG7.
461 See generally Paula L. Hannaford-Agor, Nicole L. Mott, and Timothy F. Fautsko,
Evaluation of the Centers for Complex Civil Litigation Pilot Program (National Center for
State Courts, June 30, 2003), archived at http://perma.cc/TW3H-JXQ9.
462 Debra Lyn Bassett, The Hidden Bias in Diversity Jurisdiction, 81 Wash U L Q
119, 131 (2003). See also Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee at *14 (cited in
note 114).
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the ALI’s Dual Judicial Sovereignty principle assumed that federal cases belong in federal court. But there is no sound theoretical or practical reason that justifies that belief.
In order to remedy the mistakes of the previous two eras,
Congress should consider embracing the principle of monetary
significance and complexity as the touchstone of jurisdictional allocation. Such an organization has been part of judicial federalism
since the first amount-in-controversy requirement (in the 1789
Judiciary Act). This principle would clarify that judicial federalism is not about avoiding local biases, providing uniformity, or
allowing expert federal judges to resolve federal cases. Rather, it
is about concentrating the kinds of cases that can best take advantage of each forum: large and complex cases in need of a national solution in federal court, and small and local cases in state
court, regardless of the substantive law at issue. Such a change
would also be in line with CAFA, which unabashedly moves large
class-action cases to federal court even if those cases involve only
state law questions. As previously discussed, the federal government can exploit economies of scale, procedural efficiencies, and
its “federal franchise” to provide high quality judicial services
across the nation. This is better than localized state litigation that
is limited by the state’s own territory.
CONCLUSION
This Article began with an observation: over the last thirty
years, the federal government has upended traditional conceptions of judicial federalism. The federal government has relentlessly expanded federal jurisdiction, removal jurisdiction, and
federal law to areas previously controlled by state law and, most
importantly, to cases previously located in state court. These series of changes mark a new era of judicial federalism, one that has
an array of effects on state and federal courts and may be contributing to weak state-court budgets.
Once we examine the political economy of judicial federalism,
it becomes clear that large institutional defendants fueled this
third era. But hidden in the crevices of this new era is a series of
benefits and costs to the system. On the negative side of the
ledger, state procedures are increasingly drifting toward plaintiff
preferences and federal courts toward defendants; this may cause
further federalization and forum shopping. Large business defendants are also now seemingly divorced from the well-being of
their local judiciaries, perhaps weakening the financial base of
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those systems. Finally, state courts have a diminished ability to
shape certain areas of the common law. On the positive side of the
ledger, however, federal courts have efficiently exploited economies of scale and the “federal franchise,” and have better-aligned
court competency with outcomes.
Those interested in promoting a better balance between state
and federal court should look to the third era of judicial federalism and ask: Is this the optimal allocation of cases between state
and federal courts? I suggest that even if that is true, we may
worry about distributional consequences for state litigants. In
light of institutional constraints, the health of our judicial federalism may be best protected by increasing the financial resources
and vibrancy of state courts.

